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“The economic transmission of power without wires is of all-surpassing importance to man. 
 
 
 
By its means he will gain complete mastery of the air, the sea and the desert. 
 
 
 
It will enable him to dispense with the necessity of mining, pumping, transporting and burning 
fuel, and so do away with innumerable causes of sinful waste. 
 
 
 
By its means, he will obtain at any place and in any desired amount, the energy of remote 
waterfalls—to drive his machinery, to construct his canals, tunnels and highways, to 
manufacture the materials of his want, his clothing and food, to heat and light his home—year 
in, year out, ever and ever, by day and by night. 
 
 
 
It will make the living glorious sun his obedient, toiling slave. 
 
 
 
 
 
It will bring peace and harmony on earth.” 
 
 
Nikola Tesla, 1905. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The electricity grid as it currently exists – a vast network of electricity production and 
consumption nodes, connected by mammoth transmission wires – is a testament to 
one of the most fundamental properties of electricity: it is not a stock but a flow. 
Electricity is energy, and traditionally societies have used high-energy density objects 
produced by the natural world as an intermediary means of storing energy until it was 
needed. Most recently, fossil fuels proved a very effective means of distributing this 
potential energy through a society, but have done so at a high cost to the environment.  
 
Advances in energy technology have spurred nearly all of the great turning points in 
the history of humankind, with the advent of agriculture, horsepower and fossil fuels 
each ushering in their own new age and social structure. Now in the early years of the 
twenty-first century we find ourselves on the brink of another period of immense 
change; the fossil-fuel based society of the past two centuries must adapt to the reality 
of climate change and diminishing natural resources, or fall victim to its own insatiable 
appetite for energy. Fortunately our planet is well-endowed with a nearly inexhaustible 
energy source in the radiation provided by our sun, but the adaptation from our current 
dependence on fossil fuels will require massive improvements in the ways we obtain, 
deploy and consume the energy that fuels and sustains our society.  
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the use of fossil fuels must be phased out in 
favor of electricity. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
asserted that by the year 2050, carbon emissions must be brought to 80% below the 
1990 level in order to reduce the likelihood of dangerous anthropogenic climate effects 
(Solomon, 2007). A recent report found that for California to achieve this goal, end-use 
energy consumption will need to be electrified, with electricity accounting for 55% of 
end-use energy in 2050, versus 15% today (Williams et al., 2012). Furthermore, this 
electricity will need to come from decarbonized suppliers, meaning that renewable 
resources will be the electricity generators of the future. This transition will make the 
ability to cheaply and efficiently store electricity an absolute necessity.  
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Electricity cannot truly be stored but must be either maintained chemically in a 
battery or converted to an alternate, storable, form of energy that can later be 
converted back to electricity for future use. Producers of electricity have never been 
able to effectively “bottle up” a unit of electricity and sell it to consumers in the manner 
that other commodities are sold in a conventional market. The commoditization of 
electricity necessitated the development of the grid, a system that would allow the 
electricity produced at fossil-fuel powered plants to make its way to end-users. The 
mammoth electricity transmission and distribution wires that crisscross all modern 
countries characterize the 20th century paradigm of energy use, which consisted of a 
centralized load serving entity coordinating the output of a number of large power 
plants, connected by massive transmission lines. The urgent need to begin using 
renewables to produce the massive amounts of energy consumed by our society, 
however, paired with rapid advances in the technology that will enable such a 
transformation, mean that this paradigm is under threat, along with the institutions that 
formed alongside it.  
 
This paradigm shift will present major challenges to those responsible for 
maintaining a reliable electricity grid. The clean energy produced by intermittent 
renewables is highly desirable from an environmental standpoint, but it presents a 
major problem to utilities trying to match electricity supply with demand on the grid: it is 
not dispatchable. Resources like wind and solar generation produce energy only when 
the weather allows, while electricity consumers conduct their energy-intensive business 
in effective ignorance of where the electricity comes from. For an operator of the grid 
that needs to indiscriminately and instantaneously supply energy to end-users across 
the system, this presents a significant technical challenge, not to mention the economic 
issues that are associated with goods that cannot be stored.  
 
At its very core the industry of creating and distributing energy is not a competitive 
one but has traditionally been treated as a “natural monopoly” over generation assets 
and distributional equipment, where utilities are allowed to own and operate 
transmission and distribution lines in order to provide electricity to consumers at a 
regulated price. Regulation means that consumers are protected from the exercise of 
excessive monopoly power, but is also a source of inefficiencies that would not exist in 
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a truly competitive market. In the electricity “market” as it currently exists, supply is 
limited and inelastic in the short run due to the formidable economic and regulatory 
barriers involved in the construction of a traditional, fossil-fuel powered power plant. 
Meanwhile it can be difficult to predict an electricity demand that is the result of the 
aggregated behavior of millions of consumers that are not quick to change their 
behavior based on price signals, although slightly more price elasticity has been 
demonstrated in the medium to long-run in California (Borenstein, 2009). Furthermore, 
the difficulties involved in tracking a unit of electricity as it travels through a physically 
complex grid with few capabilities of internal feedback make the principle of marginal 
cost pricing, an important feature of any competitive market, a virtual impossibility.  
 
The development of energy storage systems (ESS) within this electricity grid, paired 
with the deployment of other “smart grid” technologies, could potentially address many 
of the technical and economic issues faced by the California energy sector. A “smarter” 
grid paired with effective price signals would incentivize electricity consumers to take 
more control over their electricity use, using energy storage and other load-shifting 
techniques to capitalize upon price differentials that would reflect the true cost of 
producing electricity at its time of use. Appropriate deployment of ESS could also 
eliminate the ease with which energy suppliers can exercise market power by 
decoupling supply and demand, allowing the grid itself to monitor and respond to 
market fluctuations. Lastly and perhaps most importantly in the context of California, 
storage has the potential to “smooth” and temporally shift the supply of electricity from 
RES, a service that will be of great value to the state as it moves towards lower-carbon 
energy sources.  
 
California has traditionally been a leader in the United States in terms of 
environmental action; one of the boldest steps the state has taken towards 
sustainability in recent years has been the establishment of an aggressive Renewables 
Portfolio Standard (RPS). As the result of a series of legislative actions beginning in 
2002, California now provides nearly 20% of its electricity from renewable resources, 
with mandatory targets to reach a 33% penetration level by the year 2020. Admirable 
as these efforts may be, they have been imposed on an electricity grid and an energy 
sector paradigm not accustomed to the difficulties of matching intermittent renewable 
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energy generation with inelastic electricity demand.  As outlined in detail later in this 
report, the California ISO has identified several serious threats to grid stability and 
reliability that could develop as an increasing portion of our energy is supplied by 
intermittent RES. Basically, the output of renewable electricity resources like solar 
panels and wind turbines is intermittent and dependent upon natural cycles, while the 
electricity use habits of consumers are dictated more closely by their daily schedules. 
This means that while state policy continues to encourage massive amounts of private 
investment in newer and bigger renewable energy generation facilities it may become 
difficult to efficiently integrate into the grid all of the resulting renewable energy, due to 
an inability to store it until it is needed for use by consumers. In accordance with these 
issues, the state of California has instituted a series of regulatory and policy 
instruments intended to ensure that adequate electricity storage capacity is developed 
within the power grid over coming years. 
 
On October 1st, 2013, a mandate was adopted by the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) requiring that 1.325 GW of energy storage capability be installed 
on the California electricity grid by 2024, through the actions of the state’s three 
investor-owned utilities. While this is a bold first step towards mandated energy storage 
in the United States, it may be only the beginning for an energy storage industry in this 
state. It has been well established that energy storage would prove to be a useful asset 
on the California electrical grid, but the development of storage capacity past the 
requirements of the mandate will depend upon whether storage can be made cost-
effective. Much of the value that storage creates is a public good: many storage 
applications allow the grid to operate more efficiently as a whole, but not necessarily in 
a way that can be monetized by any particular party. As a public good, these systemic 
benefits of storage capacity will be supplied sub-optimally in the absence of 
government intervention. The energy storage industry will accordingly be one that is 
strongly affected by the tides of change in technology, regulation and economics in the 
California energy market. This report will focus primarily on the intersection of the 
second two of these factors, largely leaving the technological questions to more well-
informed parties while seeking to establish what regulatory and economic 
considerations might be undertaken to ensure that the road to deployment of 
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appropriate energy storage systems is made as clear as possible so that this 
technology can reach the socially efficient level on the California electricity grid.  
 
Chapter 2 will assess the nature of the California electricity grid itself as the 
landscape upon which AB 2514 has been imposed. Electricity market institutions such 
as the system operator, energy exchange platform and utilities will be examined by 
virtue of their relationship to energy storage on the CA grid. An explanation of the 
issues posed by RES that necessitate the establishment of storage capability on the 
grid will be accompanied by an examination of the role each of these institutions will 
have to play in doing so.  
 
Chapter 3 will present an overview of energy storage as a concept, beginning 
with an introduction to key technologies but ultimately taking an application-specific 
approach to what storage technologies may be deployed, as well as where on the grid 
and for what purpose. This chapter will look at the opportunities that exist for the 
owners, operators and investors in storage technologies to monetize and recover the 
value that their investments create for the electricity grid and society as a whole, and 
will also explore areas where future value propositions may be created. Regulatory 
developments relevant to this issue will be introduced and examined by virtue of their 
potential to create a tangible marketplace for ESS technologies that provide many 
valuable services not recognized by the current regulatory paradigm and consequent 
market structure of modern electricity markets. 
 
Chapter 4 will look towards the future of the California electricity grid and 
envision the impacts that the development of different types of storage technologies 
may have on the evolution of the way electricity is used and provided in California. 
Several scenarios will be developed to predict how technological change, regulatory 
measures, and general economic incentives may affect the nature and distribution of 
ESS that are deployed on the California electricity grid. 
 
Chapter 5 will assess the scenarios created and conduct an analysis of how the 
development of an energy storage industry in California could provide value in 
addressing the grid issues associated with the state’s ambitious renewable energy 
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goals. From this analysis, a conclusion will be drawn about how storage could best be 
cost-effectively used to create a more sustainable and reliable electricity grid for the 
state of California, and general policy recommendations will be made towards this end.  
 
It is the aim of this report not to promote a specific technology or even an energy 
storage industry as a whole, but rather to shed some light on the effects that the 
development of such an industry could have on the California electricity market and the 
energy use paradigm that governs modern electricity grids worldwide. With the 
adoption of AB 2514, a grand experiment was set in motion that will benefit the entire 
world as California tests the uncharted technological, regulatory and economic 
territories of grid-scale energy storage capacity. It is a time of change in the electricity 
industry, and energy storage is a potentially transformative technology that could very 
well enable the shattering of an energy use paradigm that has held the world captive to 
fossil fuels for over a century.  
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Chapter 2: The California Electricity Market 
 
2.1 Market Structure 
Like the market for any good, the California electricity market exists fundamentally for 
the purpose of matching supply with demand. In most markets the laws of economics 
suffice to balance these two amounts, albeit with periods of scarcity and 
overabundance. The market for electricity differs in this characteristic due to the lack of 
storage capability – there are no “electricity warehouses”- and the ability to 
instantaneously match supply and demand is crucial. Failure to do so may result in 
planned or unplanned blackouts, or, in the extreme, damage to user equipment (AUS 
Consultants) or to the electricity grid itself. To borrow a metaphor from Peter Fox-
Penner’s book Smart Power: Climate Change, the Smart Grid, and the Future of 
Electric Utilities, it is helpful to think of the electricity grid as a network of ponds that are 
all connected by channels of varying size. When electricity is generated in one area, it 
is analogous to releasing an amount of water into one of the ponds, with the excess 
water spreading through the network of channels as the water level is equalized across 
the system. Electricity consumers can be thought of as pipes drawing water from each 
of the ponds, each with a level of flow that fluctuates with energy use. The amount of 
water entering and exiting the network of ponds must be matched on a second-to-
second basis or the water level will drop too low or overflow, interfering with the ability 
of the network to provide a reliable supply. Much of the complexity of the California 
electricity market is designated to simply matching supply and demand (in as socially 
efficient a manner as possible), which requires the cooperation of a variety of publicly 
and privately coordinated institutions.  
 
Both the federal government and state governments are intimately involved in 
electricity regulation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates 
wholesale electricity transactions - transactions in which the purchaser does not “use” 
the electricity but instead sells the electricity to another party. In the 1980s, the FERC 
adopted “market-based” regulation of electricity transactions in wholesale markets.  It is 
this market-based regulation that constitutes the “deregulation” of all wholesale power 
markets in the U.S. On the other hand, state regulatory commissions regulate retail 
electricity transactions. Any transaction in which the purchaser is an end-user of the 
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electricity is a retail transaction. About half the states in the U.S. have “deregulated” 
retail electricity markets by adopting some form of “retail competition” in which 
consumers can choose to purchase their electricity from various competitive retail 
providers. In most of these states, if a consumer chooses not to purchase power from a 
competitive retail supplier, the local utility is still required to provide consumers with 
electricity on a “default basis”, at prices regulated by the state utility commission.   
   
California electricity markets are “deregulated” at both the wholesale and retail 
levels.  Wholesale prices are determined in competitive markets subject to FERC 
market-based price regulation. Retail prices charged consumers by public utilities are 
subject to regulation by the CPUC, while the retail prices charged consumers by 
competitive retailers are unregulated. To enhance wholesale competition as a 
foundation for introducing retail competition, in 1996 the California legislature 
authorized two public-benefit, non-profit market institutions known as the California 
Power Exchange (CalPX) and the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). 
While it operated, the CalPX operated certain day-ahead and hour-ahead electricity 
markets.  However, the CalPX was disbanded during the 2000-2001 California Power 
Crisis and its market-operating functions were taken over by the CAISO.  
 
Today, the CAISO operates 24 hourly auction-based day-ahead markets as well 
as an hour-ahead day-of market that allows wholesale suppliers and purchasers of 
electricity to transact at market-clearing prices and quantities in each “zone” of the 
market (Kritikson, 2000). These CAISO auctions result in mutual financial commitments 
between buyers and sellers, which are the main determinants of the dispatch of 
generation by the CAISO. The CAISO also purchases certain “ancillary services” (AS) 
on a day-ahead and longer-term basis to assist it in operating the grid reliably. 
Suppliers in these AS markets agree to allow the CAISO to order them to undertake 
certain actions on a real-time basis for grid-balancing purposes. These adjustments are 
traditionally made through orders to dispatch traditional, fossil fuel-powered generation 
plants with the ability to quickly ramp production up and down.  
 
Many of these plants are quick-start, simple-cycle gas turbine “peaking” plants. 
In the absence of electricity storage, additional plants such as these would likely have 
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to be built to enable the integration of large amounts of additional intermittent 
renewable generation. Finally, the CAISO attempts to balance the system on a 
moment-to-moment basis by operating 10-minute-ahead “real-time” markets during the 
day of actual grid operation. The real-time market is used to make last minute 
adjustments by a largely computerized system that monitors energy imbalances on the 
grid (Kritikson, 2000). Through these mechanisms, the CAISO balances the needs of 
around 30 million electricity users with the production capabilities of 671 power plants 
along 25,865 miles of transmission lines (Trabish, 2012), though an equally important 
role is played by electric utilities. 
 
2.2 Utilities 
Electric power utilities typically own and operate the distribution systems used to 
interconnect retail electricity consumers to the grid at large. Providing this delivery 
service necessarily places them in a commercial relationship with retail customers.  
These utilities also are the exclusive providers of electric energy to retail customers 
except in those states that have adopted retail competition. Even in these states, 
utilities typically serve a large portion of the retail energy market. In the early days of 
electric power, electric utilities were vertically integrated, regionally regulated monopoly 
companies that performed all retail services from the installation of light bulbs for 
customers to the generation and distribution of the electricity to power them (Fox-
Penner, 2010). The role of utilities has evolved significantly since those early days, 
however, and even more extremely in California since the 1996 passage of AB 1890 
and the consequent deregulation of the California electricity industry. Regulations 
prompting utility divestment of generation capacity (with some exceptions) have 
caused utilities to adopt a role more oriented toward electricity distribution and, 
recently, the provision of “energy services”, including energy efficiency measures and 
storage capacity. 
 
  The three investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that serve California - Pacific Gas and 
Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) 
– own 70% of the California transmission system, while publicly-owned utilities (POUs) 
and other public agencies own the remaining 30% (Independent Energy Producers 
Association, n.d.). All electricity that is consumed in the state of California, even the 
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electricity provided by competitive retailers, passes through these lines, which means 
that utilities are uniquely poised to monitor energy use and gather relevant data, a 
service that will prove essential to a state with the goal of pursuing a more efficient and 
sustainable electricity grid. The problem is that utilities’ profits have traditionally been 
based on the “natural monopoly” they have over transmission capability and derived 
from volumetric electricity sales, providing an incentive to increase “throughput” of 
electricity through their wires even when doing so is perverse to the goal of energy 
efficiency (Kushler et al., 2006). This issue was confronted by California in the early 
1980s through the “decoupling” of utility profits from volumetric energy sales, which 
were replaced through the periodic regulatory setting of a pre-determined revenue 
requirement. Moreover, to give utilities an affirmative incentive to encourage customers 
to adopt energy efficiency measures, they have been given performance-based 
rewards for progress towards energy efficiency goals (Kushler et al., 2006). Through 
such economic incentives, alongside the implementation of legislative mandates, the 
state of California aims to enlist utilities as major players in the campaign for a 
sustainable electricity market. Indeed, it should be the hope of utilities that they are 
included in the state’s plan for the future, because as providers of a service (energy), 
they must respond to the changing demands of the society they serve. California no 
longer wants just cheap energy, but clean, reliable and efficient energy as well.   
 
  This trend is not isolated to California but is in fact indicative of a global shift in 
the utility industry. A recognition of the true costs of traditional electricity production 
combined with the advent of new, cleaner energy technologies have enabled a new 
energy use paradigm, in which utilities and other Load Serving Entities are expected 
not just to provide cheap electricity. Combined, these changes to the energy sector 
constitute not just a challenge to utility companies, but an existential threat that will 
require utilities to adapt or face becoming obsolete. The traditional profit streams of 
utilities are in decline as an increasing amount of emphasis is placed on efficiency over 
cheap energy. For evidence of this we can look to Europe, where renewables have 
already achieved market penetration levels comparable to those that California will 
soon reach, causing an “existential crisis” for utilities (The Economist, 2013). Figure 1 
demonstrates how the earnings before tax & interest (EBIT) for European utility 
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countries has declined from 2011 to 2012, and projects further decline in earnings from 
conventional generation in particular, as the year 2020 approaches.  
                                   
Figure 1: Declining value creation potential from conventional generation, the core 
profit pool in the European Utility Industry (2012).  
 
 
In a move indicative of the change afoot in the utility industry, Germany’s 
second largest electric utility, RWE, recently announced plans to transform its business 
model, reinventing itself as a “renewable services provider” (Lacey, 2013). The 
company’s existential crisis came about as a result of plummeting profits, with 
recurrent net income falling by fully one third since 2010 (The Economist, 2013). 
Renewable energy and the changes to the electricity grid that will accompany them 
pose a significant threat to the conventional value streams of these companies, but at 
the same time present an opportunity for forward-looking industry players to benefit 
from capturing new profit opportunities as they come to exist. Energy storage is one 
sector in which utilities are currently evaluating the prospects for positive investment, 
and a promising one at that. A recent survey of 54 utility executives from 13 countries 
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across the globe found that although 23% saw energy storage as a potential threat to 
profits, 29% identified energy storage systems (ESS) as a development with the 
potential for revenue upside (St. John, 2013). Given their predominant position in the 
energy sector, it will be important that utilities see the potential value of energy storage 
and are made able to capitalize upon this value through proper regulatory measures.  
 
2.3 Integration of Renewable Energy Resources 
The California electricity market has been in the spotlight many times, but most  
       recently much attention has been directed toward the state’s Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, which currently mandates that by December 31st, 2020, one third of all 
energy retail sales in the state must be derived from renewable sources. This is a 
target that will likely increase, as the recently passed Assembly Bill (AB) 327 
authorized the CPUC to establish even higher procurement goals for the future 
(DSIRE, 2013). The 2003 Energy Action Plan adopted by the CA energy agencies 
further strengthens the state’s support for renewables by mandating a “loading order” 
that must be implemented by LSEs when participating in CAISO auctions, wherein 
cost-effective energy efficiency strategies must be the first method employed in 
meeting electricity demand, followed second by cost-effective renewable energy 
generations. Only after these two resources are fully utilized may conventional energy 
sources be employed in meeting load (Trabish, 2013).  
 
This trend towards higher levels of electricity market penetration by renewable 
energy sources is consistent with the state’s ultimate goal of carbon dioxide emissions 
reductions to 80% below 1990 levels by the year 2050 (Williams et al., 2012). It is also 
a trend that could threaten the reliability of the grid and the stability of electricity prices, 
necessitating a variety of technological and regulatory responses of which storage is 
one. The closure of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station will also have a 
significant impact on the availability of consistent, clean energy and further necessitate 
the implementation of load balancing and capacity resources such as storage on the 
California grid (Olson, 2013).   
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Load Shifting 
Given the intermittent nature of renewable energy generation, there has been 
considerable discussion of the roles that energy storage could play in helping to 
“smooth” the supply of electricity from such sources. Indeed, this has been the most 
highly publicized and politicized argument in support of energy storage deployment in 
California, and will ultimately prove to be a technologically necessary one should 
intermittent RES achieve a high enough level of market penetration. Figure 2 displays 
the average hourly output from renewable energy sources in California over the course 
of a day. It can be seen how, when averaged over the course of a year, renewable 
energy generation follows a general pattern that declines during daytime hours as wind 
facilities, which produce the majority of their energy during nighttime hours, decline in 
output. It can be seen that as of 2012, wind and solar energy actually complement 
each other fairly well, with one balancing the output of the other to create an average 
net load that is fairly consistent on an hourly basis and that only dips by a maximum of 
8000 megawatts (MW) over the course of the day. This could easily change as either 
solar or wind energy overtakes the other as the dominant RES on the California 
electricity grid.  
 
Figure 2: Average hourly output of Wind and Solar PV energy resources for 2012.  
 
Source: CAISO website.  
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When discussed in reference to its role on the grid, renewable energy 
generation is treated as “negative load” rather than conventional generation due to 
its unpredictability and variability. This “negative load” allows the CAISO to lower 
the amount of traditional generation plants it dispatches during the day, when 
electricity demand is low and the amount of energy available from solar RES is 
high. A problem arises, however, when electricity demand skyrockets around 4 PM 
with people returning home from work and consuming energy, even as solar PV 
production is in decline and wind energy has not yet begun to supply much energy. 
Figure 3 was created by the CAISO to demonstrate the reality of this challenge and 
has been designated the “duck graph”. It illustrates the predicted net load for each 
hour of a typical day in March, for each year through 2020.  
 
Figure 3: The Duck Graph 
  
Source: CA ISO, 2013b. 
 
The actual profiles of this day in March during 2012 and 2013 are not overly 
alarming, but the change seen between the net load profiles of these two years 
(created from real data, not projections) is more of a cause for concern. Even over the 
course of one year the required “ramping” capability – the ability to bring new sources 
of generation online quickly to meet net load – required to address this late-afternoon 
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net load swing nearly doubles from around 3,000 MW to almost 6,000.  As is evident 
from the projections of future years in the graph, a considerable and increasing amount 
of strain will be placed on the grid operator to be able to address this swing in net load 
as the amount of energy produced by renewable energy sources grows. The current 
“duck graph” projections end with a need for 13,000 MW in around 3 hours, but the 
“neck” of the duck will only continue to grow with increasing penetration of renewables. 
In the years after 2020 we could be looking at a “giraffe” graph if steps are not taken to 
address this issue.  
 
 The reason for the immense swing illustrated in the duck graph is that 
unpredictable, intermittent resources have a very low “capacity value”, which is one of 
two main metrics that are used to assess the grid benefits of a generation facility. The 
other main metric, “energy value”, refers to the amount of energy that a facility will be 
able to supply to the grid at any given time, while the “capacity value” refers specifically 
to the amount of power a generation facility can reliably provide the grid at hours of 
peak demand. The reason “capacity value” is such an important metric is because it 
measures not only the amount of a facility’s energy that will be able to be sold at peak 
energy prices, but also because a high capacity value means that a generation facility 
has the capability of deferring investment of other forms of capacity i.e. traditional 
peaking plants. 
 
 A recent case study of California found that both wind and solar PV facilities 
saw their incremental capacity value decline significantly as renewable penetration 
levels increased, with the capacity value of additional solar PV decreasing by fully two 
thirds as the penetration of that technology approached 10% (Mills, 2013). The 
capacity value of wind is low even at low penetration levels due to the non-coincidence 
of wind energy generation with demand in that state of CA, but still declines by nearly 
50% as wind approached a 10% market penetration level. The upshot of all of this is 
that with increasing levels of intermittent renewable generation that is non-coincident 
with peak demand in the state of CA, an increasing number of expensive, fossil fuel 
powered peaking plants will need to be constructed in the absence of energy storage.  
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ESS present a compelling solution to this problem due to several unique 
characteristics that make them far more effective than peaking plants in addressing 
these grid issues. The first and most basic feature that differentiates energy storage is 
its ability to act as both “load” and “generation” on the grid – at any given time, many 
ESS can either draw energy from, or provide energy to, the grid. This makes them 
economically compelling as a complement to renewable energy sources because they 
can absorb the excess or low-price energy created by VRES at off-peak hours, and 
then use that energy when the grid has higher levels of demand, either selling it back 
to the grid at higher prices or allowing ESS owners to avoid the need to purchase high-
priced energy, opting to draw their energy from the ESS instead of the grid. Essentially, 
pairing intermittent RES with energy storage restores their capacity value.  
 
Though electricity consumers engaging in such arbitrage would be doing so for 
their own good, there is a welfare effect associated with such behavior in electricity 
markets that comes in the form of lower electricity prices for all grid-connected 
consumers (Sioshansi, 2010). This is due largely to the elimination of the system need 
for expensive peaking plants and their high marginal cost energy as electricity demand 
that would typically prompt grid operators to bring peaking plants online is shifted to off-
peak hours. This concept, known as Permanent Load Shifting (PLS), is illustrated in 
Figure 4 on the following page with a simplified example illustrating a wind-powered 
RES that overproduces during the day. This figure is only illustrative, and is not 
intended to serve as a representation of actual data.  
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Figure 4: Supply Shifting/Load Balancing Capabilities of Storage  
 
 
Source: Denholm, 2010. 
 
In this graph of a hypothetical electrical system with high penetration of 
intermittent wind generation, it can be seen that surplus wind energy is being 
produced between hours 12 and 18, when net load decreases due to dwindling 
electricity demand. Placing ESS on the grid would open up the possibility of 
“absorbing” this excess energy and using it to offset the need for additional 
generation capacity, in the form of flexible thermal generation (FTG), later in the 
day. In assessing which grid assets to employ in meeting peak load, the industry 
typically evaluates alternate strategies using Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE), 
which ranks technologies by their cost per unit of energy provided over an entire 
lifecycle, as a metric. From this point of view, this practice makes sense only if the 
cost of installing sufficient ESS to achieve this is less than the combined cost of 
installing and operating FTG, which would be largely dependent on natural gas 
prices and carbon prices. In light of CA’s aggressive RPS and the massive social 
need to reduce carbon emissions, however, another factor needs to be taken into 
account; the potential curtailment of RES. Without storage, this “surplus” wind 
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energy would not even be produced, as intermittent RES would be ordered to 
curtail their generation so as not to overload the grid with too much electricity.  
  
Renewables Integration 
Even today on the CA electricity grid, energy that could be produced at an 
incredibly low marginal economic and social cost is turned down due to the fact that 
basically, the grid cannot absorb it. The Tehachapi region in CA is one area where 
the utility operating the wind energy generation facility has to practice curtailment 
around 6-8% of the time due to congestion of local transmission lines (Fink et al., 
2009). Curtailment of RES remains an exception on today’s electricity grid, but it 
has been demonstrated that curtailment levels increase in a non–linear fashion with 
increasing penetration of intermittent RES, as shown by Figure 5 below.  
 
 
Figure 5: Simulated Curtailment of Variable Generation as a Function of Storage 
in ERCOT. 
 
Source: Denholm, 2012. 
 
In this simulation of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) grid, 
significant curtailment does not begin until around 50% of the energy used by the grid 
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is produced from wind and solar generation, but increases very steeply after that point 
without storage capacity. This causes the LCOE of RES to increase equally quickly, 
due to the fact that LCOE is inversely proportional to capacity factor in a generation 
facility with zero marginal operational costs (Denholm, 2012). This is consistent with 
findings that on the CA electricity grid, solar PV and concentrated solar power (CSP) 
facilities would experience substantially greater curtailment without storage capabilities 
than with them as penetration levels approach 15-20% for each technology (Mills, 
2013). It is important to note that while significant curtailment does not begin until fairly 
high levels of penetration are reached, without ESS the diminution of the value of RES 
energy begins far earlier than curtailment because a portion of the energy they produce 
must be sold during low-price periods.  
 
For CSP in particular, it was found that while without storage, 7% and 48% of 
energy produced at these penetration levels would have to be curtailed or sold at low 
prices, respectively, the ability to store this energy for 6 hours would essentially 
mitigate curtailment while keeping energy sold at low prices below 2% (Mills, 2013). 
This is an especially promising value proposition because CSP, which operates by 
harnessing solar heat to create steam, is naturally a very good candidate for the 
installation of a thermal energy storage (TES) system. TES has the potential to make 
CSP more dispatchable an energy resource than either wind or solar PV, which would 
significantly raise its capacity value over that of other intermittent RES (Madaeni et al., 
2011). 
 
Ancillary Services 
The final, and most pressing issue that an RPS poses to the California electricity grid is 
an increase in short-term variability of electricity output with increasingly intermittent 
RES. While the average, long term patterns that VRES follow (see Figure 2) are fairly 
predictable, the variability of these resources on a daily, hourly, and even second to 
second basis can be extreme. Figure 6 on the following page illustrates the real-time 
variability seen in the output of a solar PV facility in Arizona.  
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Figure 6: Real Time Variability in output of Solar Electricity Generation Facility in 
Arizona  
 
Source: Apt & Curtright, 2008 
 
Although you can see that the general outline of the output from this one day at 
a solar generation facility in Arizona follows a similar shape as the annual averages 
displayed in Figure 6, it can also be seen that the actual real-time output of the facility 
can vary from peak to nearly zero in a matter of minutes or less. As an increasingly 
large percentage of our electricity is derived from RES this creates a need to obtain 
“flexible resources”– those that can switch very quickly from acting as a neutral or even 
positive load on the grid to acting as a supplier of energy– to account for this problem. 
To return to the pond analogy, these are the resources that allow the system operator 
to keep the “water level” even on a second-to-second basis, despite potentially large 
fluctuations in the real-time inputs to the system. A 2010 California Energy Commission 
study found that the 33% penetration level targeted by 2020 could cause “extreme” 
degradation of the performance of the CA electricity grid without investing in mitigation 
technologies such as flexible resources (KEMA, 2010).  
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Many energy storage technologies fit this description, both for their ability to 
both withdraw and supply energy to the grid, effectively doubling their regulation 
capabilities (Lin, 2011), and for their comparative advantage in speed – most batteries 
can provide instantaneous power to the grid at speeds on the order of a few 
milliseconds (Divya & Østergaard, 2009). There already exists a commercial market for 
such services – known as the Ancillary Services (AS) market in California. As our 
energy sources become increasingly intermittent, these markets will only expand as a 
reflection of the grid’s need for load balancing resources; AS markets will be discussed 
in detail in section 3.4. 
 
In sum, an increasing level of RES on the California grid presents a range of 
issues to grid operators, utilities, and ultimately anyone who relies on the CA electricity 
grid. Some of these concerns are more immediate than others. Lower-cost substitutes 
for ESS may exist up to a certain point of market penetration, but although studies 
have found that with “low levels of VRES [variable renewable energy sources] 
penetration in a strong grid, electricity storage is not crucial” (Beaudin et al., 2010), 
they have also concluded that storage becomes increasingly important for grid stability 
as RES levels increase. As an expert contact on SoCal Edison’s special projects 
management team put it, ESS application may not be essential even at the 33% 
market penetration level targeted by the RPS, but it will become increasingly important 
and feasible as penetration levels reach 40-50%, and “that is the direction the state is 
heading” (SoCal Edison, Personal communication, October 2013). 
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Chapter 3: Energy Storage 
The previous chapter entailed a description of the technical, regulatory and economic 
landscape of the California electricity market into which energy storage technologies 
will be propelled by Assembly Bill 2514. More specifically, AB 2514 will promote the 
deployment of “energy storage systems” (ESS), defined as “commercially available 
technology that is capable of absorbing energy, storing it for a period of time, and 
thereafter dispatching the energy” (AB 2514). The bill, passed in 2010, also authorized 
the California Public Utilities Commission to begin proceedings towards establishing an 
acceptable target for the procurement of such technologies by the state’s IOUs. This 
broad definition of ESS was intended to “embrace a mix of ownership models and 
contribute to a diverse portfolio that can encourage competition, innovation, 
partnerships, and affordability” (CPUC, 2013).  
 
3.1 Assembly Bill 2514 
On October 17, 2013 the CPUC established a procurement goal of 1.325 GW by the 
year 2020 for the three IOUs, further directing Community Choice Aggregators and 
Electric Service Providers (ESPs - i.e., competitive retailers) to acquire the equivalent 
of 1% of their generation by the same date. Table 1 on the following page outlines the 
procurement goals set for IOUs, which shares the same basic structure as the 
regulations currently in development that will guide procurement for publicly owned 
utilities (POUs). In the relevant press release, the CPUC established three main goals 
as underlying their decision to incentivize the development of energy storage capacity 
in California (CPUC, 2013): 
 
1) Optimization of the grid, including peak reduction, contribution to reliability needs, or 
deferment of transmission and distribution upgrade investments  
 
2) Integration of renewable energy  
 
3) Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, 
per California’s goals 
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Table 1: California ISO Energy Storage Procurement Goals, by MW of Capacity.  
Year 2014 2016 2018 2020 Total 
Southern California 
Edison 
     Transmission 50 65 85 110 310 
Distribution 30 40 50 65 185 
Customer 10 15 25 35 85 
Subtotal 
     SCE 90 120 160 210 580 
Pacific Gas and 
Electric 
     Transmission 50 65 85 110 310 
Distribution 30 40 50 65 185 
Customer 10 15 25 35 85 
Subtotal PG&E 90 120 160 210 580 
San Diego Gas & 
Electric 
     Transmission 10 15 22 33 80 
Distribution 7 10 15 23 55 
Customer 3 5 8 14 30 
Subtotal SDG&E 20 30 45 70 165 
Total 
     All 3 utilities 200 270 365 490 1,325 
Data from California Public Utilities Commission. 2013 
 
 
 
Each of these three goals also identifies a broad category of value for any ESS that 
can address these present and future grid adaptation issues.  
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The mandate allows for flexibility in that an IOU may defer up to 80% of target 
storage capacity to a later installment period, if they demonstrate that the mandated 
amount is not operationally or economically viable for them during the stated period. 
This will be helpful to IOUs in allowing them to procure storage capacity cost-effectively 
as it becomes technologically available, but the flexibility is limited. The bill also 
includes an absolute installation deadline of 2024, meaning that by this year there will 
be fully 1.325 GW of installed energy storage capacity on the California electricity grid. 
This is an exciting development given the potential for energy storage to be a “game 
changer” for the California electricity grid, yet AB 2514 will be only the beginning for the 
energy storage industry in this state.  
 
The flexibility of the mandate, along with its emphasis on cost-effectiveness, 
means that despite the hard procurement goals, even under the mandate energy 
storage will only be deployed where the technology is an economically viable choice. 
For example, in deploying their portion of the ESS technology under the mandate, 
SoCal Edison has stated that they will use an application-specific approach in which 
they identify the most promising value streams for storage and match these niche 
applications with the most cost-effective, appropriate ESS technology (Rittershausen 
and McDonaugh, 2011). What this means is that energy storage regulation and 
deployment should be viewed as a way to fulfill a need of the electricity grid, rather 
than as a means of promoting a certain technology. If alternative means of addressing 
these issues are more cost-effective, they should be deployed before ESS.  
 
3.2 Application Categories 
Section 2.3 identified several significant challenges that will confront the CA electricity 
grid in coming years, that energy storage has the potential to address. Some of these 
categories were permanent load shifting, the need for more flexible resources with 
quick ramping capabilities, and the goal of achieving the state’s RPS and GHG 
emissions goals as efficiently as possible. Most uses of ESS fall into one of these 
broad categories, but there are several other distinctions that are important to 
recognize regarding the deployment and use of ESS, as they will largely impact the 
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ability of ESS to be properly remunerated and will have implications for the structural 
future of CA’s electricity grid.  
 
System Security Vs. System Adequacy 
Most of the value to be derived from energy storage technologies is a result of their 
ability to make the electricity grid more flexible in the face of a shifting regulatory and 
technological environment, thereby increasing the overall reliability of the grid. The 
National Energy Research Council (NERC) has defined system reliability as “the 
degree to which the performance of the elements of the technical system results in 
power being delivered to consumers within accepted standards and in the amount 
desired", and identified two distinguishable aspects of grid reliability. These are system 
security, which relates to the ability of the system to withstand contingencies, and 
adequacy, which refers to the ability of grid operators to consistently meet the 
aggregate power and electricity demand of all consumers (Oren, 2005).  
 
Storage technologies are often classified by energy capacity and power 
capacity, and these characteristics will play a large part in determining which of the two 
grid reliability categories a technology may prove useful for at the grid scale. Figure 7 
on the following page provides a comparison of the different extant storage 
technologies by rated power and discharge time at that power level, as well as 
providing some examples of use categories that technologies with certain 
characteristics might fulfill, along the top of the graph. Technologies that lie near the 
bottom of the graph are known as Limited Energy Storage Resources (LESR) as they 
can provide power at their rated capacity for only a short amount of time, such as 
seconds or minutes at most. LESRs such as flywheels and certain batteries are more 
applicable to the provision of grid security, and are valued mainly for their ability to 
provide ancillary services. The technologies listed farther up the graph, notably CAES, 
Flow Batteries and Metal-Air Batteries, have longer charge and discharge cycles and 
are able to provide electricity to the grid for longer periods of time, but often at the cost 
of flexibility. These resources provide adequacy to the grid by increasing the capacity 
value of RES, and are valued primarily for their ability to permanently shift broader, 
more predictable energy usage patterns and allow ESS owners to take advantage of 
temporal differentiation in electricity prices.  
  27 
 
Figure 7: Power and Energy Capacities of ESS Technologies, with Applications. 
 
Source: <www.energystorage.org> 
 
Security and adequacy are two distinct grid characteristics that require the 
implementation of correspondingly distinct technologies to achieve. Both of these are 
services that will be essential to the CAISO and the CA electricity grid in general as our 
electricity is obtained from increasingly intermittent resources like wind and solar 
generation facilities. 
 
Locations within the Grid 
Another important classification category, and one that the CPUC in fact identified and 
accounted for in their mandate, is the location of storage capacity on the grid. The 
three categories identified by the CPUC are transmission-connected, distribution-
connected and storage that is located with end-users; this report will add a fourth 
category, that of generation-owned and sited (this falls under transmission-connected 
in the mandate, but the distinction is significant enough to warrant a fourth category). 
Although the CPUC has established targets for each category provided for in AB 2514 
(see Table 1), the ultimate location and ownership of energy storage facilities beyond 
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the mandate will be determined more significantly by the characteristics of the 
technologies that become competitive as the energy storage industry grows and the 
influence of regulation. Certain operational features of successful technologies, 
including but not limited to safety, durability and energy capacity, will also have a 
strong influence on the outcomes of this category. This category is especially intriguing 
because the location of storage, along with who owns and operates it, will play a major 
role in determining whether energy storage technology is deployed as just another part 
of a centralized, utility owned electricity grid, or as a truly disruptive technology that 
challenges the current energy use paradigm.  
 
Use Category 
There are a variety of recognized value propositions for electricity grid services that 
storage can fulfill. Which specific application a facility will be applied to will depend 
largely on the previous two categories. The likely uses of storage, by location along the 
grid, are displayed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Likely Use Categories of Storage, by Location.  
 
The use cases listed here are the most potentially valuable discrete value 
streams of an ESS, and therefore the most likely uses of an energy storage system 
should it be introduced to the grid under the ownership structure of a party looking to 
maximize profit. Many of the benefits of energy storage are the most valuable when 
provided to the electricity grid as a whole (Denholm, 2012), and Section 3.5 will 
examine these systemic effects of storage. These use cases were developed 
 Adequacy/Capacity Security/Flexibility 
Transmission 
and Distribution  
Line and Transformer Deferral, Load Shifting 
(Peaking Plant Deferral, Renewable Penetration) 
Stability, Ancillary Services 
(Frequency Regulation, Spinning 
Reserve) 
End-Use Load Shifting/Peak Load Reduction, Energy 
Arbitrage 
Power Quality/Reliability, 
Distributed Generation & Smart 
Grid Support Reserves 
Generation Increased Value of Generation/ MWh 
(Dispatchability), Spinning Reserve, Capacity 
Deferral, Load Balancing,  
Voltage/Frequency Regulation.  
  29 
considering technical feasibility, the accessibility of the relevant markets to certain 
parties, and the incentive structures guiding players at various locations on the grid. 
The realization of these use cases depends upon, in addition to the two variables listed 
here, ownership category (which will influence the operational incentives of any given 
ESS) and the market avenues that are created for proper remuneration of each use. 
These will be examined in Section 3.4. 
  
3.3 Technology 
It is important to this analysis to conduct a review of the state of energy storage 
technologies and their attributes, in order to more effectively match them with 
appropriate applications on the grid. Storage technologies can be implemented at three 
basic levels: bulk storage, grid-scale storage and distributed energy storage (DES). 
These can be generally classified as facilities that provide storage at the Gigawatt 
(GW), Megawatt (MW), and Kilowatt (kW) scale. This report will focus on grid-scale 
technologies, but will also review the potential for bulk storage as well as for the 
aggregation of large amounts of distributed end-use storage.  
 
The only form of storage with any prominence in electricity grids as they 
currently exist is bulk storage, in the form of pumped hydroelectric storage (PHS). The 
120 GW of PHS that is currently installed accounts for 97% of global installed energy 
storage capacity, and is equivalent to approximately 3% of the world's total installed 
generation capacity (Beaudin et al., 2010). This report will avoid PHS, both because it 
is largely excluded from the counting towards procurement targets under the AB 2514 
mandate, and due to the fact that mounting concerns over the environmental impact of 
reservoirs may limit the feasibility of such projects in the future (Yang & Jackson, 
2011), especially in the state of California.  
 
Energy storage systems comprise a wide range of technologies with many 
different characteristics. These subtleties can make a “uniform comparison of storage 
technologies (for example on a $/kW or $/kWh basis) difficult and often of limited use” 
(Sioshansi et al., 2012). For this reason I will discuss the likely technologies in context, 
as opposed to attempting to judge them across one unilateral criteria. There are 
numerous functional distinctions that can be drawn for energy storage technologies. 
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Several of those most important in determining the nature and impact of storage 
deployment in the state of California will be employed in this report. The following is a 
brief review of four of the most promising technologies, identified in the California 
Senate’s analysis of AB 2514 as likely to have an impact on the electricity grid as a 
result of their ability to provide valuable services to the grid (Senate Rules Committee, 
2010). The basic metrics most relevant to this analysis have been identified for each 
technology, while the advantages and disadvantages of each technology have been 
identified. The primary metrics identified include: 
 
Ramping: The amount of time that an ESS takes to go from zero power output 
to full power output. Quick ramping is the main feature of a “flexible” system and has 
many advantages over traditional generation. 
Duration: How long an ESS can provide power at its rated capacity. This will 
determine whether an ESS is more relevant to grid capacity or security.  
Efficiency: Indicates the energy loss involved with electricity conversion into 
and back from each ESS. Will be especially important for technologies attempting to 
take advantage of price differentials.  
Longevity: The length of an ESS life cycle has been identified as having 
important implications for both its economic (CPUC, 2010) and its energetic (Bahnard 
et al., 2013) justifications. A longer life cycle means a more useful technology.  
Cost/kWh: This metric looks at the LCOE of energy an ESS can provide. 
Although this is not necessarily the best measure of life time cost for ESS, which often 
concentrate on power, rather than energy, capacity, it is important because it is the 
metric commonly used in the energy industry and is the one that will be used to 
compare ESS will against other grid assets. 
 
Several other important, but harder to quantify for inclusion in the table, considerations 
looked at include safety and locational restrictions such as energy density – 
technologies that require a large land area to store energy will be at a disadvantage to 
technologies that can do so in a compact way, especially for uses nearer to end-users. 
See Appendix 2 for a more complete listing of extant storage technologies and their 
metrics.  
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Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) Systems  
CAES systems employ off-peak power to pump air into a container, typically an 
underground salt cavern or similar geologic formation, where it is stored as potential 
energy until needed. When excess power is needed for the grid at peak hours the air is 
released and heated, passing through the turbine of an engine that converts the energy 
back to electricity for use on the grid (Chen et al., 2013). These systems can go from 
zero to full capacity of power output in 5-12 minutes - a quicker ramp rate than 
traditional gas-fired peaking plants – and typically have a high energy capacity, making 
them good candidates for meeting peak load. CAES also have large energy capacity 
and can provide energy to the grid for extended durations, making it a good option for 
PLS as well. These systems are somewhat limited in that they need to be placed in a 
location with a suitable area for placing the compressed air (such as old mine shafts) 
and also must have access to natural gas pipelines and electricity transmission.  
Advantages: Economy of scale is created allowing low capital costs /kWh.  
Disadvantages: Low energy density for aboveground CAES. Below-ground CAES 
require specific geographical features.  
Ramping  Duration  Efficiency  Longevity  Cost ($/kWh)  
5-12 minutes.  8-20 hours.  60-80% >13,000 60-125 
 
 
Flywheel Energy Storage (FES) 
Flywheels are an LESR that convert electricity to maintainable kinetic energy to allow 
for conversion back to electricity when needed at peak hours. These systems consist 
of disks rotating on ball bearings, and a generator that can convert the angular 
momentum of the desks into electricity and back. FES can store energy at relatively 
high efficiency for short periods of time, but are also subject to high rates of self-
discharge due to frictional losses over longer periods (Rastler, 2010).  
Advantages: High efficiency, very responsive/flexible resource. Long lifecycle equates 
to lower capital costs per kW provided.  
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Disadvantages: Low energy density, inability to provide power for long durations. Very 
high initial capital costs.  
Ramping  Duration  Efficiency  Longevity  Cost/kWh  
<4 milliseconds 1 hour or less.  93% >100,000 7800-8800 
 
Thermal Energy Storage (TES) 
TES systems use off-peak energy to create thermal energy that is then stored in a 
medium until it can be used either as thermal energy or for conversion back to 
electricity. These systems have the advantages of simplicity, safety and the ability to 
alter the air conditioning patterns of buildings, which the CPUC estimates account for 
more than 40-50% of a buildings' peak electricity demand on hot days ("Ice Bear 
Energy Storage System").  One of the most promising TES systems employs air 
conditioning systems that create large amounts of ice during the middle of the night, a 
period of very low electricity demand, and then use this ice to cool entire buildings 
during the day without the contemporaneous use of electricity. By taking advantage of 
a diurnal effect and creating the coolant (ice) at night when thermal energy efficiency is 
high, as opposed to during the day when it is hotter and thermal efficiency is lower, 
such systems are able not only to shift a building’s AC energy usage but also to reduce 
it, making the “effective efficiency” of these systems as compared to conventional AC 
units greater than 1 (Ice Energy). 
Advantages: High efficiency, low levelized costs.  
Disadvantages:  Only applicable for certain uses (primarily AC), does not truly store 
electricity but rather shifts usage. Heat loss makes energy storage for periods longer 
than daily cycle unfeasible.  
Ramping  Duration  Efficiency  Longevity  Cost/kWh  
N/A  6 hours 80-99% ( >100% counting 
diurnal effect) 
25 years.  Low. 
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Battery Storage Systems  
Battery systems encompass a wide range of technologies that employ an equally wide 
variety of chemical processes to maintain electricity within a container for a period of 
time, allowing it to be discharged as needed. Other than the use of chemical reactions 
to store energy there are few unifying characteristics for these technologies, but 
several promising battery technologies are identified here.  
 
Flow Batteries 
Flow batteries consist of two tanks of electrolyte solution, each with an electrode and a 
circulation system that pushes the electrolytes into a central unit where they are 
separated by a membrane. As electrolytes flow through the system they undergo 
reduction and oxidation (redox), which allows them to store or provide electricity, 
respectively. A recent study showed that flow batteries have a lot of potential to be a 
cost-effective storage option, but required “technical validation of performance and 
durability at smaller scale” (Rastler et al., 2012). 
 
Advantages: While power capacity is limited by the size of the membrane, the energy 
storage capacity (duration at rated power capacity) can be increased by increasing the 
volumes of the two electrolytes and is thus theoretically limitless (Leung et al., 2012). 
Modularity also means that rated power can also be increased relatively easily, 
meaning it may be possible to lower costs by creating economies of scale in the future. 
Full discharge possible without damage to system.  
Disadvantages: Low energy density, requires large area. High levelized cost for 
commercially available technologies. Commercially available technologies undergo 
damage with cycling.  
Ramping  Duration  Efficiency  Longevity  Cost/kWh  
Seconds. 4-5 hrs. (for commercially 
available) 
65-70% Theoretically 
limitless, but 
currently low.  
> 500 kWh 
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Metal-Air Batteries 
Metal-Air batteries have several advantages over traditional batteries; their 
fundamental ingredients are plentiful and inexpensive, they involve no toxic 
components and they have the potential to store energy for comparatively long periods 
of time. While not commercially proven, these systems were found by a survey of 
emerging storage technologies to have significant potential to provide storage services 
with at the “lowest projected [capital] costs” (Rastler et al., 2012). Though this 
technology is only on the brink of commercial grid-scale deployment, the following are 
the projected characteristics of a new Zinc-Air battery developed by Eos Energy 
Storage (Eos Energy Storage, 2013). These batteries are being deployed by utilities 
worldwide for the first time during 2014, and as such have not been truly tested, but 
these numbers can be considered those of a competitive, and nearly commercially 
available metal-air battery.  
 
Advantages: Safety, Modularity, Low levelized costs.  
Disadvantages:  Not a high efficiency. Long life-cycle technologies not yet 
commercially proven.  
Ramping  Duration  Efficiency  Longevity  Cost/kWh  
Immediate 4-6 hours.  75% >10,000 160 
 
Li-Ion Batteries 
Li-ion batteries have a long history of use in consumer electronics where they are 
valued for their high energy density and relatively low weight, with approximately 10-12 
GWh installed globally (Rastler, 2010). This commercial maturity provides a market 
advantage; this technology is positioned to be the primary battery system for electric 
and plug-in hybrid vehicles, and could prove applicable for grid uses with duration 
needs less than 4 hours.  
Advantages: High Efficiency. High energy density.  
Disadvantages:  Limited lifespan. Safety Concerns (Fire). High levelized costs.  
Ramping  Duration  Efficiency  Longevity  Cost/MWh  
20 milliseconds  15 min. – 4hrs.  90% Info not currently available 900 - 6200 
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Battery systems currently take a back seat to other energy storage applications, largely 
due to safety and cost-effectiveness concerns, but rapid advances in battery 
technology will make them formidable competitors in the energy storage field in coming 
years.  
 
In actually procuring and installing storage capability, utilities and commercial 
investors alike will weigh the costs of each technology against the attainable value 
streams for each application to determine whether or not they will be a cost-effective 
deployment. These value streams are subject to and dependent upon both the 
regulatory treatment of storage and market developments. Considerable uncertainty 
exists in both of these areas, and could serve as a barrier to investment in storage 
technologies.  
 
3.4 Value Recovery/Means of Monetization 
The main factor governing if and how storage becomes an independent and 
transformative industry is an economic one; storage facilities will not be installed if 
there are not sufficient prospects for owners and investors to recover the value that 
they create. Though energy storage provides an array of benefits to the grid, much of 
the value created by an ESS may be difficult for potential investors to monetize and 
profit from. This could prove a substantial impediment to investment in energy storage 
technologies. A medley of factors including but not limited to ownership, regulatory 
developments and electricity prices will influence the potential for investors in storage 
capacity to obtain the financial compensation needed to make the project cost-effective 
(OEERE, 2011). Figure 8 on the following page illustrates the projected market size for 
the key potential value streams of an energy storage industry. This graph clearly 
illustrates that the potential for value creation exists for a prospective energy storage 
sector. However, the means for recovery of that value may not yet exist under the 
current electricity market structure in California.  
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Figure 8: Projected Size of Market Potential for CA Energy Storage Industry, by $/kW.  
 
 
            There are two main obstacles to the realization of the value created by energy 
storage; the first reason for this is the fact that many of the services provided by 
storage – decreased likelihood of blackouts, generally lower electricity prices, etc. – 
can be classified as public goods. If the electricity industry in CA remained a vertically-
integrated system owned and operated by utilities, this would not be an issue as these 
overarching entities would be able to internalize most of the benefits provided by 
storage to the system as a whole, by virtue of their position. In a deregulated, market-
operated electricity market, however, such goods are plagued by monetization issues 
such as the free-rider problem, and often will not be produced at socially efficient 
levels. The right amount of grid-connected energy storage can provide a plethora of 
indirect benefits, but parties will not invest in this level of storage if they cannot realize 
value from it. This is one argument for utility ownership of a certain amount of the 
energy storage capacity on the grid; due to their relationship with the public sector, 
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utilities are able to achieve cost recovery from such public goods through the Cost 
Allocation Mechanism (CAM)1. While a private investor would look skeptically at the 
cost-recovery prospects of installing storage for a generally more reliable grid, utility 
companies are in fact guaranteed cost recovery as well as a reasonable level of profit 
for investment in assets deemed beneficial to the grid by the public sector (Energy 
Division, 2010). This problem is one fundamental to public goods and cannot 
necessarily be fully addressed through changes to the market structure; this first issue 
will be addressed in the Section 5, where policy recommendations are made.  
 
The second main obstacle to monetization of storage’s benefits is a matter of 
market design – storage does not fit neatly into the classification and valuation 
mechanisms used by the market upon which grid assets are currently bid and sold. 
The three main mechanisms for cost recovery of grid assets are the energy, capacity 
and AS markets (Energy Division & Policy & Planning Division, 2013). While 
alternatives to energy storage systems such as traditional generation, natural gas 
peaking plants, and even energy efficiency resources can be broadly classified and 
valued by these markets as either generation or load reduction, storage does not fit 
into this paradigm. ESS are unique in their ability to switch temporally from acting as 
either generation or load as well as in their ability to simultaneously provide multiple 
benefits to the grid. Despite these attributes, under the current system storage must bid 
into the same AS, energy and capacity markets as the other assets that these markets 
have actually been constructed for; this means that the unique abilities of storage 
systems such as extreme flexibility are not properly valued or compensated. While 
storage can still be remunerated for certain value streams in this context, studies have 
found that ESS are not usually cost-effective in scenarios where compensation is 
provided for only one or several of its value streams. For storage systems to become 
economic, allowing society to obtain all of the real but currently intangible benefits it 
provides, more comprehensive mechanisms must be constructed for the full cost 
recovery of storage projects by all parties.  
 
 
                                                            
1 The CAM is a means by which utilities can “socialize” the cost of new, CEC-approved grid 
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3.4.1 CA Energy Markets 
A good deal of ESS value lies in their ability to make the grid operate more efficiently 
and reliably as a whole, but some of their services do fit into the traditional markets for 
electricity grid assets in California. Here the CA markets for three fundamental energy 
services – capacity, ancillary services, and energy – are analyzed by virtue of their 
current and future prospects as cost recovery mechanisms for ESS. 
 
Capacity 
In contrast to other load-balancing entities such as the NYISO and PJM, the CAISO 
does not have an explicit market for capacity procurement. Rather, the CAISO 
mandates the adequate level of procurement for each LSE (currently defined as 15-
17% above the forecast system need at any time) and then leaves it to LSE’s to 
procure adequate capacity through bilateral contracts (Energy Division & Policy & 
Planning Division, 2013). Although determining the capacity value of an ESS is a 
difficult task due to the need for detailed modeling of system operations, this is a 
promising value proposition for utilities investing in ESS as capacity prices may 
increase as dispatchable generation is replaced with variable resources (OEERE, 
2011). Though ESS are not currently eligible to provide capacity to utilities through the 
RA program, the CPUC is in the process of considering a rulemaking to allow 
compensation of ESS services in this way. There is a target date of 2014 for the CPUC 
ruling, meaning that if ESS qualify, utilities will soon be able to fulfill resource adequacy 
requirements through bilateral contracts with ESS merchant owners and developers 
(Cho, 2013). There has been a discussion of implementing a formal market for capacity 
like the ones that exist for other systems (Energy and Planning Division, 2013), in 
hopes that this would address the issue that “backup capacity is needed but not 
adequately remunerated” (Beckman, 2013). 
 
Ancillary Services 
Ancillary Services markets exist to ensure that enough flexible resources are made 
available for the CAISO to bring online as is necessary to balance supply and load. In 
California, AS markets exist for Frequency Regulation, Spinning Reserve, Non-
spinning Reserve, Voltage Support and Black Start (definitions from Lin et al., 2011).  
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Frequency Regulation: A resource that can rapidly alter electricity output in response 
to direct digital control (Automatic Generation Control, or AGC) signals in order to 
maintain the target system frequency. AGC is used to maintain the Area Control Error 
(ACE) in the face of rapid load fluctuations, which can cause deviation from the ideal 
frequency and output. Can be further divided into Regulation Up (increase in output) 
and Regulation Down (decrease in output).  
 
Spinning Reserve: The portion of unloaded synchronized generating capacity that is 
immediately responsive to system frequency and that is capable of being loaded in ten 
minutes, and that is capable of running for at least two hours 
 
Non-Spinning Reserve: The portion of generating capacity that is capable of being 
synchronized and ramping to a specified load in ten minutes (or load that is capable of 
being interrupted in ten minutes) and that is capable of running (or being interrupted) 
 
Voltage Support: Services provided by generating units or other equipment such as 
shunt capacitors, static VAR compensators, or synchronous condensers that are 
required to maintain established grid voltage criteria. This service is required under 
normal or system emergency conditions 
 
Black Start: The procedure by which a generating unit self - starts without an external 
source of electricity thereby restoring a source of power to the CAISO balancing 
authority area following system or local area blackouts. 
 
In particular, the Frequency Regulation market provides a compelling opportunity for 
energy storage technologies, which can provide both Regulation Up and Regulation 
Down services, unlike traditional regulation resources. Frequency regulation is a 
particularly viable use case for LESRs, for whom “the economic opportunity….is not in 
shifting power from off-peak to on-peak, but from their rapid response rate” (NY ISO, 
March 2010). Black start also provides a promising value proposition for storage 
facilities, in particular battery systems, which need no external electricity to be brought 
online.  
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While the CAISO required only 419MW of regulation capacity in 2009 (PG&E, 
2010) it is predicted that when the state reaches its goal of 33% RPS, 1,114 MW of 
regulation capacity will be needed (CAISO, 2010). Quick ramping, flexible resources 
like most ESS can prove to be 3 to 3 times as efficient per MW rated power capacity 
than traditional regulation resources for two reasons (Lin et al., 2011).  Firstly, FR can 
achieve their target level of dispatch much more quickly meaning that they can then be 
ordered to increase or reduce dispatch more often. Second, traditional resources have 
longer ramping periods and cannot shift their dispatch from positive to neutral or 
negative quickly and thus sometimes in fact dispatch in the wrong direction to meet 
system needs. For these reasons, investment in flexible regulation resources, as 
opposed to traditional slow-ramping ones, could decrease regulation procurement 
needs by up to 40% for CAISO – an enormous cost savings (Makarov et al, 2008). A 
CPUC analysis of different ESS use cases found that Frequency Regulation revenue 
was one of the most important value streams for ESS, and that the implementation of a 
rule that explicitly values “flexibility” of a resource would improve the cost-effectiveness 
of many ESS (EPRI, 2013). The CAISO has taken steps towards compensating FR for 
this valuable efficiency improvement (see Table 3), and CESA continues to lobby for 
AS markets more receptive to ESS characteristics and that more properly value ESS 
capabilities. 
 
Energy  
In order to acquire the electricity used in AS markets, arbitrage or for end use, ESS 
that is not paired with generation will purchase electricity either from local LSEs or by 
bidding directly onto the CAISO energy market as traditional generation or load, 
depending upon their size. There currently exists a 500kW minimum for resources to 
bid onto the CAISO wholesale market (FERC, 2010), which is an improvement from 
the previous 1MW requirement, but still places an inefficient restriction on smaller 
resources. Those smaller, distributed storage resources purchasing retail energy on 
the LSE tariffs will not be participating in energy arbitrage per se as they will not resell 
the energy, but rather will purchase electricity when it is inexpensive for later use when 
prices are higher at times of peak demand. Larger resources may attempt to take 
advantage of electricity price disparities between on- and off-peak pricing periods, or 
even between different electricity markets, by purchasing large blocks of cheap energy 
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and selling it later at a higher price. There does not currently exist a very strong 
economic case for ESS as residential energy management or for large scale energy 
arbitrage in CA, but this could and likely will change as the structure of electricity prices 
and LSE tariffs in CA come to more appropriately reflect the true social costs of 
generation.  
 
There have been efforts, both at the federal and the state level, to improve these 
three markets in such a way that they will be able to more properly value and 
incentivize the unique capabilities of ESS and other FR. Table 3 on the following page 
highlights several of the most important recent pieces of legislation that have been 
passed with this goal in mind. These pieces of legislation mark progress towards the 
creation of a market structure that more appropriately values ESS and FR for their 
system benefits. In particular, the changes propelled by FERC 890 include 
amendments to the CAISO tariff that make the AS markets much more accessible to 
non-generator resources by 1) reducing the minimum power rating for eligibility to 
500kW from 1MW 2) specifying that resources will only be counted as providing energy 
under the continuous energy requirement once they have reached their target level of 
dispatch (not while ramping) 3) reducing the continuous energy requirement for AS to 
30 minutes for spinning and non-spinning reserves, 60 minutes for day-ahead 
regulation, and 30 minutes for real-time regulation (from the current unilateral two hour 
requirement) (FERC, 2010).  
 
At the moment the CA electricity markets present several disjointed but usable 
avenues for the realization of some of storages’ value streams. Of the ESS value 
streams not applicable to these markets, some are inherently restricted to certain 
ownership categories – for example the deferral of new transmission and distribution 
lines by utilities. Four general ownership categories can be identified as utilities, 
merchants, generators and end users. Each of these parties will have different 
incentives for how to use their storage capacity and indeed different prospects for 
value recovery due to some market limitations.  
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Table 3: Legislative Market Reform for ESS in CA. 
Legislation Effect Status 
AB 2514 Mandates 1.325 GW of procurement goals for IOUs in 
California by 2020.  
Active in CA.  
SB 412  Self Generation Incentive Program provides $2.00/W rated 
capacity to storage systems capable of discharging at 
capacity for at least 2 hours a day. Maximum size of 3 MW.  
Active in CA.  
Federal 
Investment 
Tax Credit 
Allows for a federal tax rebate of 30% of ESS project value, 
if paired with photovoltaics.  
Active in CA.  
FERC 890 Requires ISO to “"account for the special circumstances 
presented by intermittent generators” by developing 
appropriate market rules, tariffs, and control algorithms for 
new technologies such as ESS.  
Tariff Amendments 
implemented by 
CAISO.  
FERC 755 Establishes two-tier compensation method for ancillary 
service markets. Adds pay-for-performance standard, 
increasing the value of flexible assets like energy storage.  
Implemented by 
CAISO (with 
mileage product).  
FERC 764 
  
Transmission providers to offer an option to schedule 
energy in 15 - minute increments, creates an opportunity to 
improve CAISO real - time market design (proposed full 
three settlement market: day ahead, 15 minute real time, 5 
minute real time markets) (Casey, 2013). 
Implementation 
planned (Spring 
2014) 
FERC 784 
  
Permits third parties to sell AS to transmission providers at 
market-based rates. Requires transmission providers to 
consider speed and accuracy of resources in determining 
reserve requirements for self-supply of AS.  Creates 
reporting mechanisms to track and record ESS costs for 
increased transparency. 
Not yet 
implemented by 
CAISO. 
FERC 792 Expands Small Generation Interconnection Agreements 
and Procedures to include energy storage devices. 
Clarifies capacity stating LSE’s should “generally assume 
the maximum capacity that the storage device is capable of 
injecting when deciding whether a device may be 
interconnected” (Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, 2013) 
Not yet 
implemented by 
CAISO.  
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3.4.2 Ownership Category 
Utilities 
Utilities are perhaps the best positioned entities to simultaneously capture multiple 
value streams from energy storage projects, and as such the most likely to find cost-
effective applications for storage technology. ESS have greater value if deployed as a 
system level asset (OEERE, 2011), and utilities are the best positioned to employ them 
in such a way due to their control of T&D lines and their relationships with parties at all 
points on the grid. Utilities have been left to bear many of the costs of renewable 
integration in California. Energy storage projects will allow the deferral of expensive 
T&D system upgrades that would otherwise be necessitated by increasing levels of 
renewable energy penetration, as well as helping utilities avoid imbalance charges that 
are increasing annually with RES market penetration – total CAISO charges increased 
from around $165 million in 2011 to nearly $235 million in 2012 (Kurlinski, 2013.). At 
the same time, utility-owned ESS will be able to provide services to the CAISO’s 
energy and ancillary services markets including the newly-adjusted, pay-for-
performance Frequency Regulation market that explicitly values the quick response 
times of many ESS (See Table 3). Some regulatory uncertainty does come in to play 
here – if the storage resource is owned by a publicly regulated utility or other LSE, then 
presumably the project should be financed via the CAM – it is unclear whether ESS 
owned by such an entity should be able to access AS market revenues (DNV KEMA, 
n.d.).  
Capacity 
Utilities and other Load Serving Entities (LSE) in CA are required to procure and 
demonstrate Resource Adequacy (RA) on an annual basis. Utilities are generally 
expected to own little capacity themselves but rather to purchase their RA 
requirements through contracts with third parties, and then to distribute the costs of this 
among energy users through the CAM. There is no centralized market for capacity in 
CA at the moment, although there is discussion of introducing one in the face of 
increasing future capacity needs (Energy Division and Policy & Planning Division, 
2013).  
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Merchant  
It is unlikely that utilities will be allowed ownership over most of the ESS installed on 
the CA grid. The mandate allows for 50% ownership, but this will likely decrease as 
ESS become less of a novelty and come to be viewed as more of a standard grid 
asset, which utilities have been discouraged from owning in California since the 
deregulation of the electricity market at the turn of the century. Under the mandate 50% 
of the ESS must be procured from third parties, and if an independent industry for 
storage develops in CA it will likely take the form of merchant-owned storage facilities. 
These facilities will (dependent on the aforementioned CPUC ruling) be able to sell 
capacity to LSE’s as well as to bid into the ancillary services and energy markets. 
Specifically in the energy markets, merchant owners could look to profit from energy 
arbitrage.  
Energy Arbitrage 
Energy arbitrage is perhaps the most intuitive and straightforward potential use for 
energy storage, and is hypothetically possible for any entity that submits energy bids 
into the CAISO energy markets. Most studies have found that investments in energy 
storage technologies for energy arbitrage purposes alone would not provide ample 
revenue to achieve what is normally considered an acceptable return on investment 
(Kintner-Meyer, 2010). This could certainly change within the California framework if 
legislation is introduced to address the increasing disparity between generation peak 
hours and peak load through a more responsive, real-time pricing mechanism that 
would help create more extractable value in this area; AB 327 suggests this may 
happen before the end of this decade. Dependent on location, enterprising merchant 
storage owners could also leverage differences between energy markets; a proposed 
CAES plant in Texas is looking to do just that by purchasing and providing energy on 
both the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and the Southwest Power Pool 
(SPP) markets (Giberson, 2011). Although arbitrage is at its core a profit-maximizing 
behavior, it can produce some welfare effects by leveraging lower electricity prices in 
one area and selling them at competitive prices in another, presumably utilizing 
available energy more efficiently and cost-effectively; indeed, a study found that of all 
third-party owners, merchant-owned ESS would provide the most welfare benefits 
(Sioshansi, 2010).  
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Renewable Energy Generators 
Although it is not the most valuable use of ESS to the system as a whole to have 
facilities co-located on-site with generation due to incentive issues that lead to the 
production of an inefficiently high amount of producer surplus (Sioshansi, 2010; EPRI, 
2013), renewable energy suppliers could benefit in several ways from on-site storage.  
Higher Value for Power Purchase Agreements 
Storage capabilities would allow intermittent renewables to “smooth” their energy 
output and make their energy more predictable, and thus more attractive and valuable 
to utilities and other potential contract customers who wish to form Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs). With sufficient storage, certain types of intermittent renewables 
could become dispatchable, thus increasing their capacity value. As an expert contact 
in the Regulatory and Market Affairs Division at Brightsource Energy expressed to me 
during a conversation about storage, the storage capability that is inherently present in 
their concentrated solar power (CSP) technology is their main competitive advantage 
over other renewable energy generators, fetching their energy a higher price in Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) made with utilities. Although the several PPA’s 
Brightsource held that explicitly valued their energy storage capabilities were either 
rejected by the CPUC or have been terminated, the ability to internally control their own 
energy output is of great value to them as a generation facility (David Schlosberg, 
Personal Communication, November 2013).  
Sales on CALPX 
Generation facilities not under contract, on the other hand, could hypothetically hold 
their energy from the market until peak hours when it fetched a higher price on the 
CALPX market, a form of arbitrage of sorts. As levels of intermittent generation 
increase, however, storage will most importantly allow generators to dramatically 
decrease losses from curtailment orders, simply storing the energy until it was 
permissible to release it to the market, rather than letting their facilities sit idle. 
Curtailment comes at a high cost to renewable energy providers – they would lose both 
the 12 cent/kWh production incentive that they currently earn in CA, as well as 
effectively increasing the levelized cost of their energy because they would be 
producing less energy while capital costs remained the same.   
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Customer/End User 
Electricity consumers – residential or C&I customers - who wish for more control over 
when and at what price they purchase electricity from the grid may invest in an ESS. 
Much of the value of an ESS to an end user will be related to their own personal 
electricity bill –note that time-of-use (TOU) energy management is by far the most 
valuable potential market value in Figure 8 - by investing in an ESS, they will be able to 
avoid peak rates and reduce potentially expensive peak demand surcharges. 
Empowering consumers to take greater control of their energy use patterns is of no 
small value – this use has in fact been estimated to be the largest source of market 
potential for a national energy storage industry (see Figure 8), if the correct incentives 
are provided. For residential customers in CA, the recently passed AB 327 prohibits the 
implementation of mandatory time-of-use (TOU) pricing until 2018, at which point the 
CPUC is authorized to mandate TOU (CALSEIA, 2013). This should open up a large 
market for residential scale, distributed energy storage that can be aggregated and 
used as grid scale-assets – a similar trend is already happening with C&I customers 
who currently face TOU pricing in CA.  
 
Since the passage of the California mandate, a company named Stem has 
targeted hotels, chain stores and restaurants as potential customers for its load shifting 
technologies, which they say could decrease a customers’ energy bill by 10-40% 
(Wang, 2013). In addition to saving their customers a substantial amount of money, 
companies such as Stem may be able to sell the capacity provided by their units to 
utilities; Stem is currently in talks with some CA utilities about such an arrangement. 
The use of such technology also provides a valuable public good in generally cheaper 
and cleaner electricity, as a reduction of only 5-10% in peak demand has been shown 
to dramatically decrease electricity prices across a given area (Fox-Penner, 2010). 
Although incentives for such behavior exist for the commercial and industrial sectors 
since the implementation of time-of-use charges, until 2018 the majority of retail 
customers will receive only tiered rates that do not reflect the true production costs of 
the energy they use, and that therefore provide little incentive to manage energy use 
temporally.  
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Efforts are being made to create a more competitive marketplace for energy 
services in California, in which all parties can more easily realize the value provided by 
ESS. Indeed, bulk energy time management and ancillary service markets will provide 
the majority of the cost-effective value propositions for energy storage systems in the 
near term (EPRI, 2013). The problem with all of these niche value propositions, 
however, is that they only exist because of the fact that the grid is operating on the 20th 
century, load balancing paradigm due to the fundamental inability to store energy. 
Energy market products such as Frequency Regulation have value precisely because 
of the need to instantaneously match supply with demand, which would not be as much 
of an issue on a grid with significant storage capacity. This means that some of the 
benefits accrued to society from the installation of storage, including progress towards 
such a future grid, may be true public goods and as such must be addressed through 
policy and larger economic incentives rather than by simple restructuring of the market. 
The following section identifies some of the public goods provided by energy storage.  
 
3.5 Systemic Effects of Storage on Grid 
The role to be played on the electricity grid by ESS and its substitute load-balancing 
services will only increase as California moves closer to its 2050 emissions reduction 
goal. The recently legislated AB 327 has established California’s 2020 goal of 33% 
renewables as a floor, and authorized the CPUC to further increase RPS procurement 
goals. Between this and the recent success of the state’s carbon cap and trade 
program, which has completely sold out of permits during its first two years of operation 
(Spross, 2013), it can be stated with a fair amount of certainty that the state is headed 
in the direction of continually expanding levels of RES as well as towards the 
internalization of the costs of carbon emissions. These trends will combine to create 
more viable cost-effective applications for energy storage, as a complement to a 
growing RES sector. At the same time, the ability of the grid to store electricity from 
these resources through ESS will become a much more important public good as well.  
 
 Section 2.3 discussed the increasing probability of curtailment of RES as market 
penetration levels increase, if storage is not installed or other measures taken to 
prevent this. The alternative is a huge public investment in transmission lines at an 
equally huge cost to taxpayers, but this will not be necessary if storage is installed in 
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strategic locations, allowing loads to be shifted by a couple of hours or more. Both 
California’s RPS and its cap and trade program will function to bolster the case for ESS 
as a means of reducing curtailments and avoiding overinvestment in transmission. 
  
ESS technologies are valuable to the grid as a whole because they give grid 
operators the ability to maximize energy production from the lowest marginal cost (and 
cleanest, if pollution costs are internalized) generation resources on the grid, given the 
generation assets that exist. At the moment, when RES facilities are told to curtail 
production they reduce their output of zero marginal cost, zero emissions energy, 
which is later compensated for by ramping up production of peaking plants, usually in 
the form of Flexible Thermal Generation (FTG). RES producers operating under a PPA 
are fairly indifferent when it comes to curtailment because their contracts with IOUs 
include a provision that they will be compensated at a specified price for curtailed 
generation (Mulooly et al., 2011). This system is fundamentally inefficient from an 
economic, a GHG emissions, and a purely energetic point of view.  
 
Economic 
When the grid turns down a unit of renewable energy, it means two things. First, that 
unit of curtailed energy will need to be compensated for by the production of an equal 
unit of fossil-fuel derived energy at a later time, which in addition to costing more under 
the GHG cap and trade framework also creates the need for more FTG capacity. 
Second, due to the fact that the RPS mandates that a certain amount of energy 
delivered for retail use be derived from renewable sources, the decision not to produce 
this unit of renewable energy also means that another unit of renewable energy must 
be produced elsewhere as well, to fulfill RPS obligations. If all RES are not producing 
energy at 100% of their capability, it will require the construction of more RES plants on 
the grid than is truly necessary to reach this goal. It will also require overinvestment in 
the expensive FTG facilities that compensate for these RES during on-peak hours.  
 
 Even though electricity prices do not represent with complete accuracy the 
actual marginal system costs of producing a unit of energy, they can be a good proxy 
for the overall efficiency with which grid assets are being employed because they do 
reflect a general socialization of the costs of electricity production by the utility or other 
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load serving entity. A 2004 study modeling the effects of CAES, battery and PHS on 
electricity prices found that in a scenario involving 20 percent wind energy supply by 
2030, storage could function to significantly decrease electricity prices (Sullivan et al., 
2008). It is important to consider that many ESS value propositions are highly 
dependent on high energy prices (EPRI, 2013). If enough storage is deployed to 
drastically reduce energy prices it is possible that some value propositions of these 
storage devices could be threatened by their own effects on the system. Clearly, 
however, if energy prices drop further with the addition of more storage then value is 
still created with the addition of ESS. This is simply not value that can be easily 
monetized by any single party, and thus can be considered a public good that should 
be incentivized. 
 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions  
The major externality that is often not included in the prices seen by today’s energy 
users is the social costs of the Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emitted during its production. In 
the energy sector, there is already an implicit cost in fossil fuel use due to the RPS. As 
explained in the previous section, there is a very expensive opportunity cost involved in 
the substitution of carbon intensive energy production for carbon neutral sources. 
California has taken further steps towards internalizing the costs of these emissions 
through the establishment of a cap and trade (C&T) system for CO2. In theory, this 
C&T system should lower the “cost-effectiveness bar” for ESS and other clean 
technologies by making it more expensive to use 20th century, heavily polluting ones to 
create electricity, thus incentivizing the CA electricity sector to institute a larger number 
of technologies with CO2 mitigation potential. It is not so clear, however, that ESS will 
help reduce the energy sector’s CO2 emissions as a whole if storage facilities are 
dispatched in the most cost-effective manner. The earliest applications of ESS will be 
employed towards the most profitable opportunities, and potentially towards 
applications which may not be in line with using ESS to reduce CO2 emissions as is 
laid out below. 
 
If employed properly, ESS has the potential to reduce an electricity sector’s CO2 
emissions by storing renewable, zero marginal cost and zero emissions electricity and 
using it to replace the energy that would otherwise be created by fossil-fuel powered 
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plants at peak hours. The clearest case of this would be with a storage facility owned 
and located with a renewable energy producer. This RES might be told to curtail their 
energy production at off-peak hours in order to avoid the curtailment of other resources 
with a higher cost to shut down, or to reduce the strain on transmission lines. 
Traditionally, this energy would be replaced with electricity created from fossil-fuel 
powered peaking plants, but if the RES had storage on-site they would be able to hold 
this energy until it was needed and release it at peak hours, mitigating the need for 
operation of the peaking plant.  
 
This is the most basic example, however, and the carbon mitigation potential of 
ESS becomes much less clear when storage is installed elsewhere in the grid. For one, 
an ESS that operated in the same way as the RES-owned and operated one discussed 
above, but that drew electricity from the grid, would in fact be drawing indiscriminately 
from the aggregate production of all resources on-line at that time. If fossil-fuel plants 
are running at this time, as they are in fact running 24 hours a day in CA, storage 
facilities will in fact be storing and dispatching dirty energy as well as clean. The 
inability of grid-connected storage to discriminate between clean and dirty energy 
makes the CO2 mitigation potential of ESS technologies, and thus the potential for 
CO2 reduction policies to financially propel an energy storage industry, much more 
ambiguous. An ESS integration study of the Dutch electricity system in fact found that 
the implementation of ESS increased the total amount of CO2 emissions by employing 
cheap, off-peak coal-generated electricity to offset the lower-carbon, but more 
expensive to run, natural gas plants that are used at peak hours (Ummels et al., 2008).  
 
The relationship between off-peak wind and coal may not be such a large issue 
in CA due to the relatively low amount of coal-powered baseload plants in operation in 
the state (Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc., 2010), but the lesson remains 
the same. Under real market conditions, the system with the least dispatch cost (short-
run marginal cost) is dispatched first (Greenblatt, 2013), and even though RES have a 
marginal cost of dispatch near zero, some baseload coal plants will in fact pay to avoid 
curtailing output due to potentially expensive cycling costs that could reach as high as 
$0.47–1.14/MWh of curtailed energy, under a high RES market penetration scenario 
(Lew, 2012). When cycling costs are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that 
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ESS could potentially mitigate some of the carbon cost implicit in the RPS. If an ESS 
absorbed off peak coal energy from a generator willing to pay them to do so and 
provided it to the grid later, the storage would in fact serve to substitute coal generation 
for what would normally be on-peak generation from natural gas, which is a cleaner, if 
more expensive, alternative. Until there is a carbon price high enough to offset cycling 
costs, this will be an issue. Only a price on carbon that would push baseload coal 
plants’ marginal costs of operation during off peak hours higher than the cost of halting 
operations and suffering the costs of restarting the plant will address this issue. Until 
then, coal generators would rather sell this energy at a cost to ESS facilities and ESS 
that is employed from a lowest system-cost standpoint will in fact enable coal, the 
cheapest dirty generation.  
 
While ESS, in particular ESS with long storage capacities, have the potential to 
mitigate some level of CO2 emissions, the direct emissions effects of storage 
implementation in all but the most basic applications is far from clear. Regulatory 
uncertainty abounds – for example, if an ESS provides sufficient load to allow a RES to 
continue providing energy to the grid, but the ESS draws this energy from the grid as a 
whole, should that energy be credited as free of emissions? Due to such uncertainties, 
ESS probably should not and will not be significantly affected by CO2 pricing schemes 
until a better means of establishing its system-wide CO2 effects is developed. 
 
Energetic 
Though boundary lines do need to be drawn at some point in the analysis of a system, 
it is important to at least consider the energetic effects of constructing and using 
energy storage devices themselves. Indeed, a recent study found that from a net 
energetic perspective, it would be inefficient to store the energy from a wind facility 
using any extant battery technology, largely because some of these technologies could 
only store over their lifetime the equivalent of four or five times the amount of energy 
that was expended in producing them (Barnhart et al., 2013). They further asserted 
that “electricity generated using solar PV technologies can be stored eﬃciently using 
all plotted technologies, while wind power should be stored with more energetically 
favorable storage options such as PHS and CAES” (Barnhart et al., 2013). These net 
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energy implications are important from an environmental standpoint, but likely will not 
be considered in the actual deployment of storage technologies. 
 
Significant curtailment of renewable resources in California is still a future issue, 
but a not too distant one. Figure 5 demonstrated that significant curtailment can begin 
as early as 40% market penetration of intermittent RES. At this point the decision will 
have to be made whether it would be wiser for the state to invest in energy storage to 
ensure that all of these clean energy facilities are optimized, or to construct additional 
FTG as well as more renewable energy generation facilities than is truly necessary to 
meet the RPS. This would be an incredibly expensive social investment in unnecessary 
grid infrastructure, and at this point the use case for long-duration storage should 
become much more attractive. Even before this point, however, energy storage can 
provide a valuable public good in reduced electricity prices for the system as a whole. 
Chapter 4 constructs some scenarios to see how these systemic effects of energy 
storage might play out at various levels of storage deployment on the California 
electricity grid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  53 
Chapter 4: Scenarios 
Energy storage as a grid asset is only in the early stages of commercialization, and as 
such no “standard model” has been established for how it should be deployed. It is 
unclear at the moment whether the 1.325 GW of mandated storage, or the storage 
installed after that, will take the form of large, centralized bulk storage units or a larger 
number of smaller, distributed energy storage (DES) units. Further, it is not evident that 
Energy Storage Systems (ESS) will become an established, cost-effective grid asset 
independent of the CPUC procurement mandate, which equates to a significant but 
certainly not a transformative presence of storage on the grid. As I was told by the 
former Chairman of the California Energy Commission (CEC), the true metric used by 
utilities when it comes to installation of grid assets is “what does it cost to keep the 
lights on” (Joe Desmond, personal communication, November 2013). If load serving 
entities (LSE) can “keep the lights on” more cost-effectively in the face of a changing 
grid through the use of alternative schemes and technologies, storage will not find 
many cost-effective implementations. 
 
 In this chapter, we construct several possible scenarios based on 
plausible projections of the current regulatory and economic state of the energy market 
in California. The potentially transformative nature of distributed energy storage to the 
current, environmentally damaging energy use paradigm makes it tempting to 
speculate as to what effects large scale deployment of such technology might have, 
but the difficulties involved in quantitative modeling of such systemic effects remind us 
that it is important to remember that these are only possibilities and not forecasts.  The 
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy has estimated that it would take 
approximately 10,000 person-hours to develop a tool capable of measuring and 
contrasting the respective values of distributed and bulk energy storage systems over 
the next ten years (OEERE, 2011). Though that was not an endeavor that fell within 
the scope of this thesis, what this paper truly aims to assess is not the normative 
question of how the grid should develop its storage capacity but rather the positivistic 
one of how grid scale storage likely will develop in the state of California. For this 
purpose it is important to first assess the primary “competition” for grid-scale ESS.  
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4. 1 Substitute Goods 
Energy storage is not the only answer to the issues faced by California’s evolving 
electricity grid in coming decades. Energy storage techniques are only one way to 
address the difficulties associated with renewables integration, and are unique from 
competitors only in their ability to address many of these issues simultaneously. This 
capability comes with a price tag, however, and if alternatives exist that will allow the 
grid to deal with these problems more cheaply, these will be implemented first. The 
three main grid assets that can provide some of the same services as an ESS, or 
“substitute goods”, are Flexible Thermal Generation (FTG), demand response (DR), 
and the sharing of supplies and reserves over large areas through increased 
connectivity. 
 
Long Distance Electricity Trading 
One option for integrating renewable resources is the establishment of larger 
“balancing areas” (BA) – interconnected grids that can trade energy services in order to 
establish economies of scale and more competitive ancillary services markets. The 
main value of larger BAs to renewables integration can be found in the concept of 
“statistical independence” (EERE, 2011). This term refers to the idea that while the real 
time variability in output of any given RES may be high, a larger BA can aggregate the 
outputs of a much larger amount of RES, spread across a larger geographic area, thus 
lowering the statistical probability that aggregate output will vary significantly in real 
time. There has in fact been a trend towards larger balancing areas in the US over the 
past few decades, with the CAISO recently approving the market design for a Western 
Interconnection Imbalance Market that will allow CAISO to trade energy and energy-
related services with the Oregon-based PacifiCorp, expected to go online in October 
2014 (Renew Grid, 2013). 
 
There are limits to the ability of this option to serve as a useful RES integration 
resource. First, the CAISO already constitutes a large balancing area in and of itself, 
responsible for managing 80% of California’s electricity flow and roughly 35% of the 
electricity used in the entire Western Interconnection (CAISO, 2013). While enlarging a 
BA would certainly prove beneficial to small, isolated grids, the CAISO already has 
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access to a large variety of technologically and geographically diverse resources; it is 
not clear that further expansion would provide substantial benefits to such a large BA, 
especially when the substantial transmission and congestion costs of long distance 
transmission are accounted for. Second, while increased cooperation between or even 
consolidation of BAs is desirable from the standpoint of statistical independence and 
competitive energy markets, the ability of ISOs to do so is limited by the physical reality 
of existing transmission lines. Growth in peak demand from AC units, computers and 
other modern necessities has exceeded transmission capacity annually by 25% (Brown 
& Koomey, 2003). California already faces a shortage of transmission lines which has 
caused the appearance of “transmission-constrained” areas that suffer from a lack of 
“local capacity” even while “system capacity” is in oversupply (Energy Division & Policy 
& Planning Division, 2013). Even within the context of CAISO, the CPUC has identified 
this issue as a reason to pursue investment in flexible resources (FR) like ESS, which 
can address local capacity needs without the construction of transmission lines, rather 
than to build new T&D lines, which can take five to ten years to install and carry very 
high fixed costs. All of this means that while contracts between the CAISO and other 
BAs could yield some desirable results, they would likely come with very high 
transaction costs in the form of new transmission lines.  
 
Flexible Thermal Generation 
Another potential substitute for ESS is the installation of more Flexible Thermal 
Generation (FTG) capacity, primarily in the form of natural gas peaking plants. 
Compared to other forms of conventional generation, these plants have the lowest 
upfront investment costs and comparatively high fuel costs (Eurelectric, 2011), making 
them an attractive option for LSEs looking to add capacity that will be operational only 
during times of peak load. ESS employed for the purpose of meeting peak load have 
nearly the opposite investment profile – extremely high upfront costs and negligible 
operational and maintenance costs once installed. In procuring either resource, 
potential investors will ultimately choose one based on the levelized cost of energy 
(LCOE) of each resource. LCOE computation can be a highly detailed procedure when 
discounting and other necessary subtleties come into play, but in concept is fairly 
simple: divide the lifetime costs of procuring, running and maintaining an energy 
resource by the amount of electricity it can provide over its lifetime. While this metric is 
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very complicated to compute for an ESS due to the multiplicity of potential operational 
strategies for such a system, the lifetime costs to the system, once procured, would be 
very certain as fixed, upfront costs account for a much greater portion of ESS costs 
than variable ones (Rastler et al., 2012). For FTG, on the other hand, LCOE is 
extremely dependent upon fuel prices - installing FTG is making a bet on low natural 
gas prices for ten or fifteen years, a risky move for the CA electricity grid. 
 
Traditionally FTG been used to provide peaking power as well as ancillary 
services (AS) to the electricity grid due to their relative operational flexibility as 
compared to other traditional generation plants, which often incur high costs when 
cycling – changing output to produce significantly more or less power than their rated 
capacity (Lefton & Besuner, 2006). An “average” FTG could be considered one with 
the ability to ramp at 5.1% per minute, reaching full power output in about 20 minutes, 
although newer, state-of-the-art plants will have superior operational features (Lin et al, 
2011). Though this flexibility is competitive with that of bulk storage techniques such as 
compressed air energy storage (CAES), it is significantly slower than that of most 
LESRs. This has implications for the AS applications and effectiveness of each 
technology; one study found that the CA electricity grid would require 2.5 times the 
amount of rated power capacity in FTG to provide the regulation services that could be 
provided by flywheel technology (Makarov et al., 2008).  Lin et al., 2008, provides an 
illustrative example of how a LESR might help avoid excess capacity on the grid: 
 
“Imagine that a system operator experiences a sudden generation loss. To meet NERC 
requirements2, the operator must bring on 25 MW in additional generation within the next ten 
minutes. In other words, over the next ten minutes, the system operator needs a 2.5 MW per 
minute ramp rate total from all generators providing regulation. If the only regulation generators 
are gas turbines with a 5.1% ramp rate, there needs to be 49.1 MW of these gas turbines 
online to meet the operator’s ramp requirement. In contrast, 25 MW of energy storage could 
provide the full 25 MW of additional power within 20 milliseconds.” 
    
Despite the superiority of certain ESS technologies in terms of flexibility, FTG also 
holds one very important advantage: unlimited generation capacity. While an ESS can 
                                                            
2 NERC CPS2 requirements 
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deploy electricity to the grid at is rated power capacity only until the energy it is capable 
of storing runs out, once a FTG has ramped fully it can provide its rated power to the 
grid for an indefinite amount of time, using the energy stored in a virtually unlimited 
supply of fossil fuels.  LESRs such as the flywheels modeled in Makarov et al., 2008, 
can dispatch their power instantaneously, they can do so for only a limited amount of 
time, making them more suitable for addressing unpredictable net load swings caused 
by contingencies such as weather patterns or generation loss, as in the example cited 
above. It is for this reason that although ESS and FTG will compete for some value 
streams on the future grid, at the moment the two are better viewed as complementary 
goods (Casten, 2013).  
 
The types of bulk storage ESS that could compete with FTG for applications 
with longer energy needs, such as CAES and pumped hydroelectric storage (PHS), 
faced higher upfront costs as well as the same transmission constraints as FTG, while 
LESRs are not truly viable replacements for FTG in terms of provision of peak power. 
Until a commercially viable ESS with high power and energy capacity comes to the 
market, both flexible thermal generation and energy storage resources will be 
necessary on the CA electricity grid. A study conducted by Eurelectric concluded that 
in Europe “gas-fired power stations will be one of the most important contributors to the 
integration of RES” (Eurelectric, 2011), the same will likely be true for California in the 
absence of disruptive technological change in the ESS sector.  
 
Demand Response 
Demand response (DR) can be defined basically as programs that influence the 
behavior of end-use electricity consumers through incentives or other pricing schemes 
in order to reduce their demand at peak hours. Although DR requires the use of 
financial incentives to influence behavior, it can often be one of the cheapest options 
available in addressing load balancing issues due to the capital-intensive nature of 
electricity grid infrastructure. Indeed, pilot programs in the US have reported a benefit: 
cost ratio of 7:1 for certain programs (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008). DR resources are 
already in use by investor-owned utilities (IOU) statewide that currently use them to 
meet Resource Adequacy requirements (Perlstein et al., 2012); one of the most widely 
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used DR techniques is time-of-use (TOU) pricing, which has been found to be 
especially effective when combined with critical peak pricing.  
 
 DR has the potential to provide cost-effective mitigation of grid reliability 
concerns at low RES penetration levels, but it has limitations. First, DR depends on 
shifting consumer behavior and studies have shown the when it comes to electricity 
use, consumers have a very low elasticity in the short run (Borenstein et al, 2009). 
Elasticity of demand for electricity increases in the long run and in response to very 
aggressive pricing policies, which have achieved in reducing peak demand by up to 
42% (Charles River Associates, 2005). The fact remains, however, that while some 
consumer electricity use can be shifted from peak periods with appropriate price 
signals, the electricity usage of most consumers is determined more by their daily 
schedule than by their electricity bill. While some electricity end-uses, i.e. agricultural 
pumping, can occur at any time of the day, there are some uses of electricity that are 
time dependent and simply cannot be shifted (for example, lighting or use of 
appliances) without the use of technologies with temporal load shifting capabilities. 
Second, while DR can cost-effectively shift general usage patterns, it lacks in the areas 
of response time and precision, characteristics that are essential to the proper function 
of AS markets. A recent report found that although DR could be a good candidate for 
the new flexible resources AS markets in CA, nearly all DR programs would require at 
least some modifications in order to become eligible for the AS market (Perlstein et al., 
2012). Lastly, while DR can effectively provide regulation up services to the grid, they 
are limited in their ability to provide regulation down services, which would consist of 
programs to increase consumer demand, a goal seemingly perverse to the conceptual 
motivations of DR in the first place. 
 
 Demand response measures can achieve some of the same goals as energy 
storage by taking advantage of elasticity of electricity demand, where it exists, and 
promoting load-shifting behavior through the use of incentives. In this sense DR and 
ESS can be considered competitive, substitute goods for some applications. At the 
same time, however, the very changes in consumer behavior that DR aims to induce – 
reduction of electricity usage during peak load, shifting of load and investment in on-
site generation capacity – further necessitate technologies with load-shifting capability 
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such as ESS for situations where electricity demand is truly inelastic, and energy must 
be used during certain time of day. One notable example of this is can be seen in Ice 
Energy’s thermal energy storage systems, which are used to shift customers’ electricity 
consumption for daytime air-conditioning uses to the nighttime. Through the aptly 
named “Project Cool Move”, Ice Energy aggregates a network of distributed storage 
units to provide clean, cheap capacity for purchase by utilities (Ice Energy website) 
while simultaneously allowing customers to take advantage of the incentives provided 
by TOU pricing. Thus while DR may at first disadvantage ESS by providing a lower-
cost option for shifting energy use in some situations, in the long run the incentive 
structures created by DR measures will create more value propositions for certain ESS 
technologies, especially those with long duration load-shifting capabilities.  
 
As the CA electricity grid currently exists, there are some RES integration 
opportunities for which any of these three options is capable of providing the grid 
capabilities needed at a lower cost than ESS. At the same time, ESS prices are 
dropping and will continue to do so with the implementation of the CA mandate, while 
ESS remains the most flexible and versatile integration resource available. 
Furthermore, the substitute goods listed above “are ultimately limited in scale and 
scope” (Denholm, 2012), while many of the ESS technologies coming to market are 
modular and thus scalable to grid needs. The bottom line is that as the CA electricity 
grid evolves, ESS will eventually become a cost effective option as the opportunities to 
use cheaper substitute goods expire. Whether or not ESS will become cost-effective 
before some of these substitutes depends largely upon the other factors that follow.  
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4.2 Scenario Components 
Energy Storage System Technology 
The single most significant factor to consider in the construction of grid-deployment 
scenarios is technology. Technology shifts have the potential to profoundly influence 
any market, and the market for energy storage in CA is no different. A recent survey of 
energy storage CEOs uncovered a general consensus; the probability is very high that 
one or more disruptive technologies will be introduced to the energy storage industry 
within the next five years (Munsell, 2013). Should ESS technology advance as rapidly 
as these industry experts predict, the CA energy storage industry will be one that is 
quite sensitive to technological change in its development. Although it is clearly difficult 
to predict a “disruptive” technology, some characteristics that such a storage 
technology may hold are identified. 
 
Though all storage techniques aim to improve certain metrics – efficiency, 
levelized cost of energy and power, etc. - certain types of storage technology are more 
subject to technological change than others. While bulk storage and other 
technologically simple load shifting techniques such as CAES and thermal energy 
storage are unlikely to see notable technological advances due their maturity as well as 
their physical limitations, emerging storage technologies – in particular, new types of 
batteries – are poised for major improvements in coming years.  
 
Bulk storage is currently much cheaper than battery storage for most 
applications, but batteries have an advantage over many bulk storage systems in both 
their operational flexibility and the fact that they are constrained by their current 
technological state rather than geographic or physical factors (Kintner-Meyer, 2010) – 
that is to say, there is a lot of room for improvement. In particular, battery storage is 
well poised to control the market for small scale DES due to their high energy densities 
and locational flexibilities (Rastler, 2010). Important areas for battery improvement 
include: 
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Safety 
For any ESS that would be located with or near residential DG units, safety is the 
primary concern. Battery technologies that have not shown that they can perform 
safely without risk of fires or other hazardous events will not be installed at the 
residential or community level. In particular, Lithium-Ion batteries are prone to 
oxidization reactions and fires, and must undergo extensive and expensive safety 
precautions before being ready for such an application (Hadjipaschalis et al., 2009).  
 
Durability 
One of the main limiting factors in achieving cost-effective battery storage is the short 
life cycle of many of these technologies. A study found that increasing the life span of 
batteries to be the most feasible way to increase the “energy stored on electrical 
energy invested” (ESOI) ratios – the life-cycle energetic efficiency – of using these 
devices (Barnhart et al., 2013), which is an important consideration in terms of 
sustainability. Increased durability of these devices will similarly increase the return on 
investment (ROI) of these devices, decreasing their LCOE over their lifespan and 
improving cost-effectiveness (EPRI, 2013).   
 
Materials 
An important aspect of a successful battery technology will be the resources it uses to 
store chemical charge. The choice of abundant resources to serve as the electrodes 
and other components of batteries will contribute to the creation of technologies that 
are both less expensive and more sustainable (Armand & Tarascon, 2008). This is one 
advantage that metal-air batteries, such as Eos Energy’s zinc-air battery system, have 
over batteries with high-efficiencies but that consume scarce and valuable resources 
such as lithium.  
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Energy Capacity 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, a disruptive battery storage technology will be 
one that is capable of providing a high energy capacity as well as the high power 
capacity that they are currently valued for. Only when battery technologies that are 
currently deployed primarily as limited energy storage resources (LESR) become 
capable of providing energy to the grid for long durations with an LCOE comparable to 
that of traditional generation will energy storage systems become a truly viable 
replacement for FTG.   
 
These operational characteristics are those of a technology that could prove 
disruptive to the energy storage industry as a whole. Perhaps most importantly, an 
ESS technology that is truly “disruptive” in terms of changing not only the applications 
for which storage is cost-effective but also expanding the ones that it is technologically 
capable of providing will need to be able to cheaply store electricity for long periods of 
time. In addition, a technology that could achieve significant enough market penetration 
to replace FTG and corner the market for DES in the state of CA must be safe, 
durable, and sourced from cheap, sustainable materials in order to gain acceptance 
from a social and a fiscal standpoint. If such a technology is modular or highly scalable 
in some other way, then opportunities could open up not just for DES but for larger 
grid-scale applications as well. 
 
CA Electricity Market Factors  
The CA electricity market is not an isolated system but rather is intricately connected to 
and influenced by developments in the economic, political and social sphere at both 
the state and the federal level. In addition to the potential for disruptive technological 
change, developments in the US energy sector as a whole that could influence the 
economic viability of ESS on the CA electricity grid. Table 4 on the following page 
outlines some of the major factors considered in the scenarios to follow.  
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Table 4: Major Factors considered in Scenario Construction.  
Energy 
Storage 
Policy 
At both the state and the federal level, the regulatory environment 
remains ambiguous for emerging storage technologies. The FERC, 
CAISO and other relevant institutions are in the midst of developing the 
“rules” that will govern and shape energy storage market prospects as 
well as the nature of its deployment in CA. 
Renewables 
Mix 
As ESS are primarily a complementary good to whatever generation 
exists on an electricity grid, the nature of the facilities that are creating 
the energy to be stored will have a profound effect on the value 
propositions of an ESS on the grid. In particular, the balance between 
wind and solar penetration under the RPS will affect the energy storage 
industry.  
Electricity 
Pricing 
Schemes 
Figure 8 identified the market potential for an energy storage industry in 
California. By far, the most significant potential value stream (at over $4 
billion for 2004-2014) was time-of-use energy cost management. This 
value stream will not be unlocked without the implementation of pricing 
schemes that more appropriately reflect the costs of energy production.  
Utility 
Influence 
The traditional utility business model has its roots in the 20th century 
energy sector paradigm of a small number of large power plants, 
connected by large transmission lines, providing most of the electricity to 
the grid. Utilities are politically powerful entities, and as many of the 
profit opportunities of utilities are stranded with this paradigm, they may 
resist the evolution of distributed generation and the distributed storage 
to come with it.  
Commercial 
Adoption 
The ability of third parties to develop a “standard model” for procurement 
of ESS towards specified applications and thereby bypass regulatory 
concerns and other uncertainties will greatly influence overall adoption 
of ESS. Residential solar systems and Ice Energy’s thermal energy 
storage systems are good examples of this.  
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4.3 Energy Storage Deployment Scenarios 
4.3.1 Baseline Scenario 
The first scenario that is important to consider is what could be called the “baseline” 
scenario. In this model, little technological change occurs for either energy storage or 
renewable technologies. The amount of renewables on the grid increases past the 33% 
RPS target, but the composition of these RES remains roughly the same with wind 
providing the majority of the energy to meet RPS compliance standards. Wind facilities 
face an increasing threat of curtailment due to both inadequate transmission and the 
threat of over-generation during certain periods of the year (Hawkins et al., 2007). The 
1.325 GW of storage is installed by 2024, but as no disruptive, highly scalable ESS 
technology with high energy capacity comes into play, this storage is deployed mainly 
to fill in niche applications. Significantly, because the mandate requires procurement of 
only 1.325 MW of storage but places no duration requirement on these resources, we 
can feasibly envision such a world where “utilities that don’t want to spend a lot of 
money on this obtain a lot of low [energy] capacity resources” (Schlosberg, personal 
communication, November 2013). On this electricity grid, storage has three main 
economical value propositions: 
 
1) Provision of Ancillary Services, in particular Frequency Regulation, to markets 
that have come to accept quick and responsive LESRs as the most appropriate 
technology for this purpose, due to their flexibility. 
 
2) Thermal Energy Storage will continue to provide a cheap load-shifting technique 
to account for excess off-peak energy from wind and other resources.  
 
3) Bulk storage for an increasing amount of wind energy that continues to have 
high output during off-peak hours.  
 
Energy storage fills some important grid needs in this scenario, but these will really 
only constitute niche applications. Wind power in CA is characterized by high 
production levels during the night and is almost completely non coincident with peak or 
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even medium levels of demand due to the fact that “wind speeds are greatest when 
system demand is lowest” (Hennessy et al., 2005). A proliferation of wind powered 
RES would necessitate, and thereby create value streams for, ESS with large energy 
capacities and the ability to store energy for long periods of time. Without technological 
advances in energy capacity, however, these value streams go unfulfilled because at 
the moment “only two technologies—pumped hydroelectric storage and compressed 
air energy storage (CAES)—are cost-effective at the large temporal scales (several 
hours to days) needed to complement wind energy” (Greenblatt et al., 2007). Without 
considerable storage on the system, transmission constraints become increasingly 
problematic in terms of both curtailment of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and 
meeting local capacity needs of certain areas.  
 
Certain RES whose nature or location lend themselves to cost-effective storage, 
especially Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) facilities, will procure on-site storage 
capabilities in order to increase their capacity payments or to reduce curtailment. In 
particular, RES facilities large enough to create the economies of scale necessary to 
justify on-site bulk storage, such as Tehachapi wind farm, will install ESS in the form of 
large scale batteries or CAES, where feasible geologically feasible. Significant market 
potential will be created for demand response (DR) and other load-shifting alternatives 
such as thermal energy storage (TES). TES for the offset of peak electricity demand 
from air conditioning is already one of the most economically viable applications on the 
grid and will continue to be used, but only to the extent that a market exists for this 
single use application. 
 
A recent CPUC report stated that there is a great need on the CA electricity grid 
for local, transmission-constrained capacity while there is in fact excess capacity for 
the system as a whole (Energy Division & Policy and Planning Division, 2013). This 
would suggest a higher value of storage facilities located closer to load, but no 
technology comes into play that will allow such deployment in this scenario. The lack of 
a technology that allows retail customers to cost-effectively manage their electricity 
time-of-use means that a huge potential value stream goes unfulfilled in this scenario, 
even if dynamic TOU pricing is introduced. The flexibility of the high power capacity 
resources added to the grid and used for certain Ancillary Services means that some of 
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the most marginal peaking plants will be made unnecessary, but Flexible Thermal 
Generation (FTG) will largely still be needed to address the fact that much of the 
energy produced under RPS does not match peak demand levels.  More transmission 
will need to be constructed in order to connect the large peaking plants that will be 
needed to meet load, as well as for the large wind generation plants that produce 
energy at night. Overall, storage is not located or operated in a way that optimizes its 
potential to enhance grid efficiency in this scenario.  
 
4.3.2 “Big Shifters” 
This scenario envisions the development of a battery storage technology that could 
store large amounts of energy for a long time, but needed to appeal to economies of 
scale at the MW level to do so. This technology would likely be a large, grid-scale type 
battery of the type envisioned by Eos Energy Storage, which produces containerized, 
MW scale metal-air batteries. It is assumed that technological advances in PV allow 
RES to shift slightly towards solar up until 2016, at which point growth slows due to the 
retirement of the investment tax credit (ITC) that currently funds up to 30% of PV 
systems costs. This is consistent with the findings of a recent study that the costs of 
distributed solar will decline through 2016, but then rise significantly in 2017 and not 
return to pre-2016 levels until after 2020 (Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc., 
2012). This has the potential to put a dent in the growth of solar PV as an industry, and 
could mean that growth slows considerably after 2016, allowing wind to fill in the 
“compliance gaps” left as per compliance with the RPS. The result is a grid that obtains 
a slightly higher proportion of its energy from solar generation than at the moment, but 
that still leans heavily on wind generation.  
 
On the regulatory side of things, the CPUC develops an asset class for energy 
storage technology and allows it to become eligible as capacity for procurement by 
utilities under their Resource Adequacy requirements. This is a likely development 
considering the recent order by the CPUC that SCE procure at least 50 MW of energy 
storage resources in the Los Angeles basin, a development that “provides a much 
needed market signal that energy storage will be considered as a key asset class to 
help California address its long term local reliability needs” (“California Requiring”, 
2013).  
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This scenario has several important implications for the CA electricity grid. It will 
enable the development of “microgrids” that can temporally manage energy use within 
a certain timeframe. These pockets of local reliability will be much less reliant on the 
grid as a whole and will have greatly enhanced local capacity and reliability, which the 
CPUC has stated as an urgent need of the CA electricity grid (Energy Policy and 
Planning Division, 2013). This ability to stagger demand between these “microgrids” 
also greatly reduces the need for transmission and distribution upgrades, because the 
need for instantaneous delivery of energy to the grid as a whole will be buffered to 
some extent. It is unclear who might own these facilities, but they will be highly 
attractive to both merchant vendors and utilities. When utilities consider procurement of 
grid assets, “the first rule of project development is site control” (Desmond, personal 
communication, November 2013), so it is clear that they would prefer for a storage unit 
to be under their ownership and control. Analysis would suggest, however, that 
creation of centralized, utility-owned storage facilities is not the socially optimal way to 
structure energy storage capacity on the grid; one study found that merchant owned 
and operated storage facilities would provide the greatest welfare benefits in terms of 
price reduction (Sioshansi, 2010).  
 
Though dynamic TOU residential pricing has not been implemented in the “Big 
Shifters” scenario, these devices would still be able to achieve some load-shifting 
value. Under a merchant scenario, this would be achieved by merchants obtaining 
large amounts of energy from the grid at cheap wholesale off-peak prices and then 
offering it for sale to nearby end-users at a price lower than the utilities’, but still at a 
profit. If the storage was utility owned, the utility could simply “charge” these storage 
facilities during off-peak hours and use them to provide power to localized areas during 
what would normally be on-peak hours, allowing them to defer expensive investments 
in FTG and transmission. Storage will help greatly reduce overall system costs in the 
“Big Shifter” scenario, but a large value proposition is lost due to faulty policy that 
continues to improperly incentivize residential electricity consumers and fails to 
encourage optimal storage use.   
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4.3.3 Solar Solution 
The third scenario envisions an explosion of solar RES on the CA electricity grid, with 
storage technologies evolving as a “Solar Solution” to the challenges produced by this 
a trend. Solar powered RES have been found to be fairly coincident with peak demand 
at low penetration rates (Denholm et al., 2007), while even at higher penetration rates 
solar PV production misses areas of peak demand by only a few hours. ESS to be 
paired specifically with solar technologies will require less energy capacity, needing to 
store the electricity for only a matter of a couple of hours or less. This seems to be a 
feasible direction for storage technologies to evolve, given the current concentration of 
energy storage companies on power capacity, as opposed to energy capacity (Munsell, 
2013), as well as the findings of one cost-effectiveness study that concluded “storage 
system duration of 2 hours exceeded cost - effectiveness of 4 hours” (EPRI, 2013). In 
this scenario, these devices would not need to appeal significantly to economies of 
scale to operate cost-effectively, but there may be few reasons to deploy them at a 
scale lower than the MW level as they would still look to more well-developed ancillary 
services (AS) markets for a significant portion of their profits. These markets would 
include the option for utilities to procure ESS ancillary service “capabilities” on a multi-
year ahead market similar to the way that utilities fulfill “Resource Adequacy” 
requirements.  
 
“Solar Solution” is a probable scenario in that solar power certainly seems to 
have a promising future in California. FERC Chairman John Wellinghoff recently stated 
his belief that solar “is growing so fast that it is going to overtake everything” (Trabish, 
2013). The “Golden State” has witnessed an explosion in the growth of its solar 
industry due to a combination of technological advances and incentive schemes. 
Figure 9 on the following page displays the impressive growth in distributed generation 
(DG) solar energy as a result of the California Solar Initiative (CSI).  
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Figure 9: Growth in CA Solar Energy under California Solar Initiative 
 
* 2007 Production figures begin at 5/31/2007. 
 ** 2013 production figures do not include production for the months of November or December.  
Source: California Solar Statistics Website. 
 
Grid-connected PV is undergoing exponential growth across the country, and 
particularly in CA where the amount of capacity (in MW) installed in 2011 increased by 
fully 110% from that installed in 2010 (Sherwood, 2012). As Figure 9 shows, residential 
PV systems are very much following this trend in California. Policy seems to be on 
solar’s side as well in California, with the recently passed AB327 removing the 
proposed cap on net metering programs in CA (Hales, 2013a). The decision will lend 
more confidence to third party solar companies and further strength an industry that 
seems poised to continue its impressive growth in the state of CA. The very passage 
and nature of AB327 indicate the growing economic and political power of the solar 
community in CA. As Carrie Cullen Hitt, senior vice president of state affairs for the 
Solar Energy Industry Association, was quoted, AB 327 is a sign that solar energy is 
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“now a significant part of the economy and that's why you see all this [legislative] 
activity.” (Carus, 2013). 
 
The actual deployment of storage on the “Solar Solution” grid would not be 
significantly different from that of the Baseline scenario, but that is due more to the lack 
of disruptive change in ESS technology than any other factors. Due to the fact that 
most ESS on this grid would be incapable of shifting load past a couple of hours, one 
of its primary value propositions would remain the Ancillary services markets. For this 
reason, it would make little sense to deploy ESS scaled lower than the MW level, as 
resources smaller than 500kW would not be able to bid into these markets (FERC, 
2010). The results of a recent CPUC use-case study found that the Frequency 
Regulation and the Spinning Reserve markets provide significant financial 
remuneration to such Limited Energy Storage Resources (LESR) (EPRI, 2013). The 
slight increases in energy capacity under this scenario would allow this storage 
technology to dominate these AS markets, replacing the need for any FTG that would 
have served this need.  
 
Ancillary services are a niche market, however, and once sufficient storage 
capacity was installed to fill them there would likely be few value propositions left for 
low-energy storage systems. The large-scale deployment of PV would help the use-
cases for this type of storage as a technology able to increase the capacity value of 
solar generation, thanks to its limited load shifting capability. As a scalable resource, 
these ESS would be able to be applied to the transmission and distribution system 
roughly in a way that roughly mimicked the composition of renewable energy sources, 
and could thus help shift load by the several hours that would likely be necessary for a 
grid with so many PV generation facilities. Bulk storage would still be applied for most 
load-shifting purposes for wind and resources other than solar, however, due to the 
inability of this technology to shift energy by a significant temporal factor.   
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4.3.4 “Sponge Grid” 
The fourth scenario, “Sponge Grid”, entails the most technological change. Under this   
scenario, solar PV costs continue to drop significantly enough to offset the expiration of 
subsidies, while the energy storage industry sees a major breakthrough in a highly 
modular technology that can store energy for long periods of time without appealing to 
economics of scale to do so. This makes for a grid that can “absorb” energy at 
numerous points spread evenly through the system, like a sponge. The prohibition of 
mandatory time-of-use (TOU) rates for residential customers expires in 2018, at which 
point the CPUC takes advantage of the authority it was recently granted by AB327 to 
establish statewide, dynamic TOU rates (Carus, 2013). The CPUC further addresses 
its noted need for local capacity (Energy Policy & Planning Division, 2012) by 
incentivizing the deployment of the 12,000 MW of distributed generation that Governor 
Brown has stated as policy goal by 2020 (Trabish, 2012). Third-party ownership 
models are created that expedite the installation of both DG solar PV and this new, 
modular storage technology, and many home owners install this technology in order to 
take advantage of the pricing disparities created by TOU pricing. “Smart grid” 
technology allows electricity consumers to become much more responsive to electricity 
prices, partially mitigating the inelasticity of demand noted of 20th century electricity 
consumers (Borenstein, 2009).  
 
       As a good that is complementary to whatever RES exists on the market, more 
distributed generation (DG) means more potential for distributed energy storage (DES). 
Eric Carlson, lead architect of energy systems at SolarCity (a residential PV installer, 
which recently installed its first 100 energy storage systems) was recently quoted 
asserting “storage will be absolutely necessary to enable the deployment of solar 
across the grid at extremely high penetrations" (Lacey, 2013a). A study of PV 
penetration levels in modern electricity grids reinforces this belief, finding that large-
scale deployment of DG PV technologies – on the order of provision of 50% of a 
system’s energy needs – would require a “radical transformation of the electricity 
system—from a centrally controlled to a highly distributed and interactive system” 
involving DES as well as other smart grid features (Denholm & Margolis, 2007b). While 
50% is a large number, recall that solar PV capacity value can drop by as much as two 
thirds when solar PV reaches market penetration of 10% on an energy basis, due to 
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non coincidence with peak demand (Mills, 2013). This scale of PV deployment, 
especially distributed PV, would create a need for ESS and other capacity increasing 
technologies.  
 
Although solar PV currently accounts for only .9% of California’s annual 
electricity consumption (Nyberg, 2013), much more significant deployment may not be 
so far off if the exponential growth rates currently observed in that California residential 
PV market continue. The installations of solar PV under the CSI have accounted for a 
percentage of total CA electricity usage that has grown at approximately 75.2% a year. 
Should this type of growth continue in California, distributed PV alone could account for 
4.1% of California’s total energy consumption, as early as 2016 (Appendix 3). Though 
the CSI program has nearly run out of funding in CA (Trabish, 2012), federal incentives 
for residential solar are set to extend through the year 2016 (Sherwood, 2012), which 
provides a level of certainty that this type of growth will continue at least through that 
year.  
 
This scenario assumes that the commercial, third party solar installation 
companies become strong enough to survive and flourish through 2016 and beyond. 
Even three years before the scheduled termination of these subsidies, the distributed 
solar PV industry is showing signs of robust growth independent of government 
incentives, due largely to “falling component and transaction costs.” (Grueneich et al., 
2013). In the first quarter of 2013 alone, 71.3 MW of capacity were installed in the form 
of residential systems, and 18.5% of that capacity was installed without the support of 
any state-level incentives whatsoever (Kann, 2013). This is an enormous advance for 
an industry that has traditionally relied heavily on state incentives and other types of 
subsidies to sustain itself, and is a good sign that DG is on the cusp of a major 
explosion in California.  
 
An important trend to note is the increasing amount of distributed residential PV 
systems that have been procured under a third party ownership model. This model 
accounts for the falling transaction costs of installation for residential customers. The 
percentage of residential systems installed under such an ownership model has 
increased more than fivefold in only 3 years, skyrocketing from 14% in 2009 to 72% in 
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2012 (Loewen et al., 2012). Dropping component costs paired with such innovative 
third-party ownership models mean that an increasing number of residential PV 
installations are being completed without any funding from the CSI, as the few hundred 
dollars available to installers of residential PV systems have become “insignificant” 
(Sherwood, 2012). “Sponge grid” sees a similar third party ownership model develop 
for the new, scalable storage technology that enables electricity customers to take a 
high level of control over their energy use. The commercial sector has already begun 
uptake of energy storage, with SolarCity recently pairing with Tesla Motors in a 
contract that will see the two companies working to develop a “service [that] will use a 
combination of solar panels, big batteries and advanced software to cut utility bills for 
clients” (Baker, 2013).  
 
The benefits of this storage deployment scenario to the electricity grid as a 
whole are enormous. Local capacity concerns are addressed, increasing local reliability 
and mitigating the need to address these concerns through the construction of new 
transmission lines. Locating storage near both DG and load means that load can be 
balanced within “microgrids”, largely mitigating the need for ancillary services. Placing 
storage close to load would reduce losses of energy during transmission as well, which 
typically run from 3-5% but can exceed 20% during peak periods of congestion 
(Casten, 2013). Peak load would essentially become nonexistent, as customers would 
take advantage of dynamic TOU rates by programming their residential storage to 
simply absorb energy when prices were lowest, and perhaps even to sell energy back 
to the grid when prices were high. Overall, the pricing disparity between periods would 
decrease, because only the lowest marginal cost resources would ever be brought 
online to provide electricity, as dictated by consumer demand. Low electricity prices 
could threaten some of the value propositions for these devices, as noted in section 
3.5, but once ESS becomes an established grid asset and no longer a novelty, it will 
likely be there to stay.  
 
DES seems to hold much promise in the state of California, especially in light of 
the state’s ambitious environmental goals, the proliferation of DG resources, and the 
stated need for local, rather than system capacity by the CPUC. If enough 
decentralized energy storage is implemented it will challenge the operational balance 
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paradigm upon which the current electricity grid is based, creating a scenario where 
homes or communities could simply charge their storage facilities when energy is 
inexpensively available, rather than having utilities and public entities racing to 
constantly match generation with demand. Table 5 below outlines the four scenarios, 
contrasting them against the attributes of the storage technology that becomes 
dominant, for side-by-side comparison.  
 
Table 5: Energy Storage Deployment Scenarios, by Technology Attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Baseline Scenario 
Primarily wind on the grid, 
more transmission, big 
losses from curtailment. 
LESRs dominate Ancillary 
Services, some bulk storage 
employed for wind load 
shifting.  
          “Big Shifters” 
Eos style, high energy 
capacity MW scale storage. 
Offsets peakers and new 
transmission lines, shifts load 
and reduces curtailment. 
Increased local capacity and 
opens door for deployment of 
DG.  
       “Solar Solution” 
Cheap, scalable storage, but 
not load shifting. DES would 
only be necessary at 
extremely high penetration 
levels of PV or DG. Storage 
still primarily valued for AS.  
            “Sponge Grid” 
Cheap, low economy of scale, 
storage that can shift load. 
Commercially deployed at 
residential scale, huge TOU 
value created, large system 
efficiency gains.  
Economies of Scale  
 
Modular, Distributed 
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Chapter 5: Recommendations for California 
The CA electricity sector will face a period of unprecedented change in coming 
decades as the grid undergoes a transformation that is a physical manifestation of the 
changing paradigm of energy use in our Golden State. The successful evolution of the 
current grid to one that is capable of absorbing clean electricity and shifting it 
temporally will require well-informed and stringent policy to guide its progress – the 
California deregulation crisis was an example of what can happen when significant 
change in the structure of the electricity market is not accompanied by appropriate 
policy. A new market design will be necessary to govern this transformed electricity 
system, and it is “likely that it will contain a significantly higher level of regulation and 
administrative intervention” (Beckman, 2013). Though government agencies will 
necessarily play a role in restructuring such an essential sector of our state’s economy, 
they will need to enlist the help of both the utilities and a robust clean energy private 
sector to implement the goals and visions of their policies. It is essential that policy 
surrounding the deployment of ESS and other aspects of the “smart grid” be well 
informed in order to appropriately guide the private sector’s actions. In this chapter, 
some recommendations are provided for the state as it moves forward with this exciting 
transformation. 
 
5.1 Barriers to Address 
5.1.1 Technical 
Some of the issues confronting ESS are a simple matter of the disparity between the 
technological capabilities of modern grid assets and those of the grid itself: ESS 
represent an advanced, 21st century technology that is being applied to a 20th century 
grid. There is a consequent lack of certainty about the interconnection process of ESS 
onto the grid and into the electricity markets. Some of these issues include: 
 
• A grid that was constructed for one-way flows of electricity rather than the two-way 
flows of energy that ESS will create, and the difficulties in maintaining a balanced 
system without the necessary metering (Ferber, 2013).  
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• Market dispatch software that is unable to account for ESS operational features 
such as the speed of dispatch, their ability to specify a negative minimum operating 
point, and the possibility to be dispatched as both regulation up and regulation 
down (Tretheway, 2010).  
• Lack of a technology capable of coordinating and netting the capacity value of 
distributed LESRs together for sale as Resource Adequacy or on future Capacity 
markets (Tretheway, 2010).  
• Inability of ISO metering systems to measure the performance of LESR with quick 
responsiveness (NY ISO, 2010).  
 
The installation of more advanced information technology at various locations within 
the grid will assist with the deployment of technologies such as ESS that require 
advanced and intricate operational strategies and signals to operate in a maximally 
efficient manner. Smart meters will be an absolutely essential aspect of any successful 
deployment of distributed energy storage (DES) for the purposes of grid efficiency. 
California has already recognized the value of such “smart grid” technology, and the 
CPUC has accordingly required that the CA IOUs install smart meters at the location of 
all end-users of electricity by 2020, with nearly 10 million already installed (“Smart Grid 
Report” – 2012, 2013). This will make for a grid that is significantly more receptive to 
ESS and other 21st century technologies.  
 
5.1.2 Stakeholder Resistance 
The energy industry has not traditionally been the most dynamic or receptive to 
change. A “game-changer” technology will be met with some resistance from 
stakeholders throughout the energy industry, resulting in inertial forces that could work 
against the deployment of energy storage on the grid despite the force of the mandate 
and the potentially high value of ESS to the grid as a whole.  
 
Risk Averse Utilities 
The regulatory and economic space in which utilities currently reside “penalizes 
innovation and risk-taking activities by utilities” because in order to be ensured their 
reasonable rate of return on investment, they must invest in assets that will be “used 
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and useful” (Grueneich et al., 2013). This, in addition to the fact that the 
“reasonableness” of a utility investment is assessed after-the-fact, means that utilities 
have little reason to pursue emerging technologies when they are ensured a profit 
margin by sticking with the energy sector status quo.   
 
Skeptical Third Party Investors 
Lack of commercial operating experience can often prove a catch-22 for emerging 
technologies projects such as energy storage when trying to gain capital investment. 
Potential financiers often require demonstrated commercial success before investing 
money with a project, but no commercial projects will be deployed until a sufficient 
amount of venture capital can be raised. The procurement mandate has addressed this 
uncertainty by essentially guaranteeing a market for the earliest grid scale ESS 
deployments, ones that would likely otherwise be viewed as financially risky projects. 
The mandate will already largely address this issue by ensuring the development of at 
least some commercial storage projects, as well as promoting a “learn-by-doing” 
approach to the development of viable market opportunities. These investors will likely 
also be put off by the complex bidding strategies that may be required to optimize the 
value of energy storage devices in a market context (Gyuk, 2011). 
 
Uninformed Electricity Consumers 
Electricity prices are a very politically charged and sensitive issue in California. 
Because most consumers have little idea where their electricity comes from but rather 
only see a bill at the end of each month, it is sometimes difficult to accept changes in 
electricity pricing. Due to their distant relationship with customers and their links with 
the public sector, utilities can come to be viewed as government entities trying to take 
undue control over electricity use. Electricity use is something that many customers 
have come to view as a right rather than a good that they consume, so when they see 
a larger bill without any explanation they will resist this change.  
 
Although part of this amounts to true resistance against utility attempts to take 
more control over electricity use, a recent Sacramento Municipal Utility District pilot 
program for dynamic pricing hypothesized that consumer resistance is more “inertia” 
than anything, noting that while 20% of people who were given the option decided not 
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to enroll in the program from the start, nearly 90% of those who were automatically 
enrolled in the program stayed in it (Herter, 2013). This inertia will likely be easier to 
address than straight out resistance to changes in pricing schemes, and educating 
customers about the environmental effects of their energy use may help them to 
become more receptive.  
 
5.1.3 Market Structure  
ESS are currently at a major disadvantage to other grid assets when it comes to 
achieving project remuneration through the energy markets in CA. Storage 
technologies must compete in prejudiced markets against alternate technologies that 
these markets have been explicitly constructed for. This makes it difficult for ESS to 
gain adequate compensation over a project lifetime to provide a leveled cost of energy 
(LCOE) or power (LCOP) that is competitive with that of potential substitutes. Some of 
the major issues with the current wholesale electricity market structure include: 
 
• Poor understanding of ESS capabilities: No firm numbers have been established as 
a basis for understanding ESS capabilities to provide grid services such as 
capacity. Better accounting will allow ESS to become eligible for the provision and 
compensation of more grid services. In particular, California is developing a process 
to understand ESS Resource Adequacy capabilities.  
• Poorly constructed price signals (wholesale): Basic market structure that does not 
explicitly value ESS capabilities. 
• Lack of cohesive regulatory framework: Uncertainty on the regulatory level makes it 
difficult to formulate optimization strategies for ESS.  
• No Long Term Contracts: At the moment, prospective ESS depend entirely upon 
spot markets such as the energy and ancillary services markets to fund their 
projects – there is no upfront funding for such services as there are for long-term 
power purchase agreements (PPA) with generators. (Lin, 2011). The uncertainty 
inherent in such an arrangement makes it difficult to promote ESS as a sound 
investment, especially in a highly risk-averse energy market environment. A long-
term contract for regulation services, similar to the ones used by utilities to ensure 
resource adequacy with conventional generation, would help overcome this 
significant market barrier (Lin, 2011). 
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Price Signals (retail) 
The wholesale electricity markets need improvement, but the state of the retail 
electricity market is perhaps even more prohibitive to potential energy storage value 
streams. The paradigm of cheap electricity as a right, combined with the political risks 
involved with opposing this status quo, have made for a regulatory and policy 
environment in the CA energy sector that favors cheap electricity. The prices that end-
users on the CA electricity grid see today are not an accurate representation of the true 
social cost of producing it, nor do they truly reflect even the purely economic costs of 
production. The two main flaws with the current pricing schemes are that 1) they fail to 
internalize the social costs of electricity production, and 2) they do not reflect the 
marginal cost of the energy consumed by any given end-user.  
 
Recall from Figure 8 that TOU energy management was found to be the single 
greatest potential value stream of energy storage applications in California. At the 
moment however, there is very little incentive for any residential purchasers of energy 
on the retail markets to manage their energy use temporally because the current 
structure of electricity contracts are not time-variant. These contracts effectively 
subsidize electricity for peak users by overcharging consumers who purchase 
electricity only when the costs of balancing supply with load are relatively low. On the 
other hand, dynamic rates reduce overall system costs by inducing customers to 
reduce electricity use during peak hours reducing the need for expensive peaking 
plants. 
 
A lot can be said about the inefficiencies inherent in a flat rate, and even in basic 
tiered electricity pricing systems, but in the 20th century the reality was that the 
information necessary to implement more accurate pricing systems simply could not be 
obtained. With the advent of the “smart grid” and advanced metering, however, there 
no longer remains any justification for these rates. As Lee Friedman puts it: 
 
“Time - invariant rates are a historical anachronism, a system of grossly 
inefficient subsidies and penalties that no longer has a legitimate basis for continuation. 
It seems unconscionable for us to continue to subsidize peak - load consumption when 
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its social costs are so great, and to penalize off - peak consumption when it holds so 
much promise as a method of environmental improvement.”  (Friedman, 2009).  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 Send Appropriate Price Signals 
The implementation of appropriate pricing systems will unlock massive potential for 
value creation in reduced electricity prices, as well as in the mitigation of unnecessary 
social costs in terms of both environmental degradation and an inefficiently costly 
electricity grid. Cost-effective energy storage would be one very promising means of 
realizing that potential by empowering energy users to take much greater control over 
the prices they paid for their electricity, with their desired time of consumption having 
much less bearing on this decision. 
 
When electricity prices are crafted in such a way that end-users face strong 
incentives to use energy at times when the marginal system costs of electricity 
production are low, it can benefit both the utility and its customers. For example, the 
thermal energy storage systems employed by Ice Energy to shift air conditioning 
electricity use to the night time profit from the time-differential prices seen by large 
electricity users in the state, while the local utility is able to reduce their peak capacity 
needs thanks to this shift. Though TOU measures have been implemented for 
Commercial and Industrial (C&I) customers in CA, however, even the tiered pricing 
system employed by the state is merely a rough approximation of temporal change in 
marginal cost of energy production. Generally speaking, the more closely a pricing 
system can induce customers to shape their electricity usage patterns based on real-
time marginal system costs, the more benefits will be created for the electricity grid as 
a whole. A comprehensive case study of dozens of utilities across the country found 
that pricing systems which “dynamically track system capacity and cost conditions” 
were most effective in achieving goals like reduction of peak demand and local 
capacity constraint (Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc., 2005). This study 
further found that when pricing programs produced net benefits to the system as a 
whole, contracts could be constructed in such a way that both a utility and its 
customers saw a share of the benefits.  
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Friedman suggests a “two-part tariff” as a basis for a new, more socially efficient 
electricity pricing mechanism. Under such a tariff, a consumer’s electricity bill would 
consist of two parts. The first part would be a “fixed charge” that was calculated to 
reflect the services that the customer received simply by virtue of being connected to 
the grid – transmission lines, the capacity of the grid to provide electricity when they 
want it, etc. This fixed charge could be applied on a tiered system to allay equity 
concerns. The second part of the bill would be a “usage charge” that was calculated 
considering both the amount of electricity consumed and the true marginal cost to the 
system of actually producing that energy (Friedman, 2009). AB 327 authorizes IOUs to 
employ a “fixed rate” charge of up to $10 per month, in order to enable cost recovery of 
fixed costs (Cares, 2013). Though this may reduce incentives for energy efficiency and 
net energy use reduction in the immediate future, it could also be an important step 
towards such a “two part tariff” electricity pricing scheme that more accurately 
represents the costs of grid services provided to end-users. 
 
In implementing these systems, it is important that electricity customers are on 
board. A very promising recent study conducted by SMUD emphasized the positive 
aspects of the new pricing plan such as savings during off-peak hours to customers, 
while dense terms like “critical peak” and “load shifting” were left for the utility experts 
(Herter, 2013). Names like Optimum Off-Peak and Summer Weekday Value Plan were 
given to the new programs. These strategies are effective but not disingenuous; 
creating better rate structures truly present an opportunity for multiple parties to benefit, 
and this study simply demonstrates that utilities will be more successful in doing so if 
they make the transition as simple as possible for customers. Volunteer programs like 
this one are a good start, but they only attract energy users who save without altering 
their electricity usage patterns. To truly have an effect on system costs, it will be 
necessary to implement mandatory, dynamic time-of-use pricing that will more 
accurately incentivize socially advantageous energy use and penalize those who 
choose not to adjust to the needs of our society, thus “reducing overall costs and fairly 
allocating those higher costs” (Bender et al., 2005). California has taken notable steps 
towards doing so in allowing the CPUC to begin implementing mandatory TOU rates 
beginning in 2018, as per AB 327 (Carus, 2013). 
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5.2.2 Equitable Wholesale Energy Market Design  
The California energy markets need to be restructured in such a way that they more 
appropriately reflect the physical realities of, and the consequent problems faced by, 
the grid. More explicit value must be assigned to factors such as location and 
dispatchability in addition to the $/MWh metric currently used for most wholesale 
prices. In creating this new market design, it is important that a democratic process 
involving all stakeholders is used to ensure that all viewpoints and values are taken 
into account. 
Public Good Subsidization 
Not all of the benefits provided to society by the deployment of energy storage are 
easily quantifiable, but research is being conducted towards this goal. The 
quantification of benefits is essential to the establishment of policies that will create the 
socially efficient amount of storage on the California electricity grid. Though the positive 
externalities produced by storage systems justify subsidies or the “design of market 
mechanisms or contracts that compensate storage owners for the external eﬀects of 
their storage use” (Sioshansi, 2010), in order to set those incentives to the right level, 
policymakers must know the amount of value that the policy will create. Once all value 
streams of a storage system are known and quantified, policymakers can proceed in 
establishing appropriate policies.  
 
Section 3.5 outlines some of the system benefits that would justify such a 
subsidy. Under the mandate, the CPUC did not agree to assign “a public value to an 
agreed upon list of benefits … [because] there is no standard value that is appropriate 
for all storage technologies” (CPUC, 2013). This is not important because the 
technologies deployed under the mandate will not need subsidization, given the 
backing from the mandate itself. As an energy storage industry develops, however it 
will be important to apply such a public good value to storage technologies to allow 
them to become competitive with substitute goods. Figure 10 on the following page 
provides an illustrative example of how the socially optimal level of energy storage willn 
be reached only through application of incentives.  
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Figure 10: The Need for Energy Storage Incentives 
 
Source: Strategen Consulting, 2011. 
 
More appropriate incentives for generation. 
Production tax credits and renewable energy credits are granted regardless of time or 
location, meaning that “current incentives for renewable energy are leading to sub-
optimal capital allocation” (Casten, 2013).  Renewable energy producers are paid on a 
$/MWh basis so that even if the energy is produced at a time when the market would 
usually tell a facility not to produce, a renewable energy producer will continue to so 
because they are blindly subsidized by these incentive structures. These figures should 
be altered so that they incentivize renewable production that serves grid needs, as well 
as services, such as energy storage, that enable local capacity needs to be met 
through the use of renewable energy.  
 
Invest in local energy systems first 
California should create a market that concentrates on meeting load with local 
resources. This will help address the local capacity needs identified by the CPUC, 
which could be met quite effectively through the creation of “microgrids” as in the “Big 
Shifters” scenario. Though transporting electricity long distances makes sense when 
generators are bidding expensive energy with differing marginal costs, this makes less 
economic sense as an increasing amount of energy comes from zero marginal cost 
RES. Currently Distributed Generation is compensated through Net Metering and other 
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incentive programs, but in the long run these should be replaced with markets that are 
more receptive to smaller resources and “that pay DG….customers for all the value 
they provide, whether it is capacity, energy, transmission and distribution congestion 
relief, ancillary services, greenhouse gas reductions, or emission reductions” (Bender 
et al.,  2005). 
 
Develop a multi-year ahead “capabilities” market 
Much in the same way that Resource Adequacy markets value the potential ability of a 
project to provide capacity to a utility, when needed, a market should be developed in 
which utilities can pay potential ESS project developers for the services they will be 
able to provide like ramping, load following, and regulation (Casey, 2013).  
 
Develop Standard Contracts for ESS projects 
The development and authorization of standard contracts for ESS project developers 
(accounting for the differences between technologies, of course) would greatly 
streamline the procurement process for all parties involved and would likely result in 
much greater uptake of ESS, where applicable. California energy markets are presided 
over by many different regulatory agencies at both the state and federal level. Project 
procurement should be streamlined to account for “gaps and overlaps” between these 
agencies that can be difficult to navigate for potential project developers (Grueneich et 
al., 2013). The California feed-in tariff allows eligible customer-generators to enter into 
10-, 15- or 20-year standard contracts with utilities electricity. A similar system could be 
implemented to allow storage project owners to provide “energy services” such as load 
shifting and ancillary services to grid for the entirety of their useful life. 
 
This strategy worked incredibly well for the residential solar market, where an 
explosion in the number of residential PV in the past five years is largely  “due to the 
increased popularity of third party ownership models in the residential solar market” 
(Loewen et al., 2012). Unfortunately, as far as the scope of the mandate, the CPUC did 
“not require the IOUs to develop standard contracts” (CPUC, 2013). By the time the 
mandate has expired, however, the ESS industry will have developed significantly from 
its current state, and it would be wise to encourage the development of standard 
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contracts in a way so as to allow the market to take over easily. This is particularly true 
if one or several types of technologies come to dominate the market.  
 
Clear Rules for ESS 
Developing an asset class for different types of storage, in the relevant markets, would 
make it much easier for potential projects to identify potential value streams. See the 
NY ISO Case Study below for a good example of how this can be achieved.  
 
Case Study: New York Regulation Market 
The NY ISO has undertaken an initiative to make their Ancillary Services markets more 
receptive to new energy non-generator grid assets such as ESS. The ISO addressed 
this issue within its Regulation Service market by creating a new category of 
Regulation Service providers, LESR’s, which is “characterized by its ability to provide 
continuous six-second changes in output coupled with its inability to sustain continuous 
operation at maximum energy withdrawal or maximum energy injection for an hour.” 
(NY ISO, 2010). These providers are limited to providing regulation services, but are 
paid in the same manner – at the market-clearing price – as other resources. This is a 
good example of how avenues for cost recovery of storage technologies can be 
implemented into current market structures. Other adjustments made by the NY ISO to 
incorporate storage included market software adjustments, real time dispatch (RTD) 
adjustments to allow the evaluation of various LESR devices to receive or provide 
electricity, and Automated Generation Control (AGC) software to allow LESR’s to be 
the first resource dispatched so as to take advantage of their extremely responsive 
nature (Lin et al., 2010). By removing the requirement of providing energy and allowing 
LESR’s to provide pure regulation services, the NY ISO has “been able to create a 
market for a new class of resources” (NY ISO 2010) in a way that will enable LESRs to 
be used cost-effectively in one of their most relevant grid applications.  
 
5.2.3 Enlist Utilities 
As was examined in section 2.2, the role traditionally played by utilities is shrinking as 
the energy use paradigm shifts away from cheap energy as a right, and towards 
electricity as a product with a cost that reflects its true social costs of its production. 
This shift has also created an equally important, if fundamentally different, role for an 
entity that can monitor and regulate energy use, ensure efficiency and reliability on the 
grid and help societies achieve their long-term energy policy goals. It will be necessary 
to fundamentally alter “utility institutional structures” to achieve a successful transition 
to the new energy grid envisioned by California (Grueneich et al, 2013). Fortunately, 
utility representatives themselves seem to recognize and in fact welcome this trend – 
over two-thirds of utilities representatives surveyed indicated a belief that the 
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deployment of smart grids – including ESS -and smart meters will create value that far 
surpasses industry forecasts (Accenture, 2013).  
 
Although many load serving entities have been disaggregated, they remain the 
best positioned entities that currently exist to plan and operate grid assets with benefits 
at the level of the entire system in mind. Given the right incentives to do so, utilities will 
prove the most valuable ally of energy storage and other smart grid technologies that 
are valuable precisely for their ability to allow the grid operate at its most efficient. 
Allowing well-regulated utilities to own and operate storage facilities will result in 
“socially optimal storage use since these entities would be concerned with both 
producer and consumer surplus changes“ (Sioshansi, 2010). Such a utility will use 
storage assets to reduce the costs of load balancing to the entire system, because it 
will be in their interest to do so. As an expert contact from SoCal Edison argued, 
limiting utility ownership of storage capacity under the mandate to 50% of procurement 
was not well-informed because when the utility owns an asset it allows for “much more 
flexibility…and it drives innovation” (SoCal Edison, Personal Communication, October 
2012). Lastly, utilities are large and politically influential entities, and their help may in 
fact be needed to achieve many of the policy and market development goals outlined in 
the sections above. This point is proven by European utilities like RWE who have 
stated that they will “fight for the most reasonable market design” (Beckman, 2013) in 
the face of a changing grid.  
 
Though utility representatives seem to be ready for the evolution of their 
organizations to occur, this will not occur unless the proper policy and regulatory 
environment is created in which utilities can undergo this transformation. This will 
involve sacrificing many of their traditional profit streams while creating new incentive 
structures for utilities, allowing them to profit from things like distributed generation, 
investment in local capacity and distribution lines, and using storage facilities to 
minimize the marginal cost of energy produced on the system at any given time. An 
alternate route would be to convert California utilities back to public entities, “smart grid 
operators” that would be by nature required to do these things, although that would 
entail the navigation of difficult political territory and is not likely in the near future.  
  87 
                 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In the context of the California electricity grid, energy storage should be viewed 
primarily as one potential means to an end – the end being an electricity grid that is 
prepared to cope with the challenges that will come with the state’s ambitious 
environmental policies. As a complementary good to generation with low 
dispatchability, the value of energy storage systems will only grow with increasing 
levels of RES penetration. In general, any development that drives the CA electricity 
grid toward higher levels of renewables or more effective internalization of the true 
time-variant costs of electricity production in the state will make for a higher value of 
energy storage. The shifting of the energy use paradigm towards one that establishes 
electricity as a marginally-priced good as opposed to a right will also make energy 
storage capacity a more valuable product, and consequently create more potential 
cost-effective deployments. This is because at the most basic level, the behavior of the 
electricity grid as a whole is dictated by electricity demand, or the aggregate behavior 
of electricity consumers. The more that end-use electricity prices in the state come to 
reflect the true cost of producing and deploying one more unit of energy at the time it is 
consumed, the more electricity consumers will come to behave in ways that facilitate 
the deployment of load-shifting assets like storage.  
 
On the other hand, contingencies that lead the California electricity grid to tend 
towards installation of further 20th century infrastructure and dependency on fossil 
fuels, without internalization of the social costs of such stagnation, will devalue storage 
systems and their potential applications. This is entirely possible in an energy sector 
still dominated by utilities with roots in the 20th century, cheap energy use paradigm, 
despite ambitious environmental policy from the state. Garnering the support of electric 
utilities is of the utmost importance in transforming the California energy sector into the 
electrified, decarbonized one that is needed to achieve the state’s 2050 emissions 
goals. To do so, California should look to the strategies adopted by utilities in Germany 
and other European states that face the same “existential crisis” as those in California. 
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Energy storage eventually will become cost effective for applications on the 
California electricity grid. This could occur through disruptive technological change, 
supportive policy, or even by process of elimination as all other means of addressing 
the reliability concerns that come with an increased level of renewable energy are 
expired. With such a potentially transformative technology, it is tempting to advocate 
the installation of energy storage as an end in itself, but ultimately this is not how 
business is conducted in the energy sector. Technologies must be commercially 
proven before even being considered for installation, and even then it is important to 
recall that as storage technologies are applied in an application specific approach, 
“some of them will be cost-effective a year from now, some 20 years from now” (SoCal 
Edison, Personal Communication, October 2013).  
 
The world will be watching as California tests the waters of grid-scale energy 
storage in the coming decade, and murky waters they are. The energy storage industry 
remains a nascent one and as such will be exposed to the tides of change in 
technology, regulation and economics. A multitude of variables will affect whether 
these tides shift in favor of or against the deployment of energy storage capacity on a 
scale that is sufficient to truly challenge the 20th century electricity grid paradigm of 
operational balance. The scenarios constructed in Chapter 4 offer some insight into 
potential technical and regulatory changes and the effects they might have on an 
energy storage industry, but in the end the development of California’s energy storage 
industry will largely be a process of learning-by-doing. The lessons learned by 
California’s energy sector will be invaluable to electricity grids around the world, but it is 
important to remember that knowledge of this type is largely a public good. While there 
is value in being first, energy storage and other “smart grid” technologies should be 
deployed only as they become cost-effective, so as not to subsidize this knowledge by 
way of an undue burden on electricity consumers in the state of California.  
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Appendix 1: 10 Year Market Potential of Energy Storage Industry in California. 
 
1 Electric Energy Time-
shift  
400  700  Low: 80% efficiency, 2¢/kWh VOC, 4 hours. High: 80% 
efficiency, 1¢/kWh VOC, 5.5 hours. 
2 Electric Supply Capacity  359  710 Low: mid/peak duty cycle combustion turbine, cost 
$50/kW-year. High: combined cycle combustion turbine, 
cost $99/kW-year. 
3 Load Following  600  1,000 Low: simple cycle combustion turbine, price $20/MW per 
service hour. High: combined cycle combustion turbine, 
price $50/MW per service hour. 
4 Area Regulation  785  2,010 Low: $25/MW per hour, 50% capacity factor. High 
$40/MW per hour, 80% capacity factor. For up regulation 
and down regulation. 
5 Electric Supply Reserve 
Capacity  
57  225  Low: $3/MW per hour, 30% capacity factor. High $6/MW 
per hour, 60% capacity factor. 
6 Voltage Support  400  800 Low: prevent 1 outage lasting 1 hour over 10 years. High: 
prevent 2 outages lasting 1 hour over 10 years. Storage = 
5% of load. 
7 Transmission Support 192 192 Based on DOE/EPRI storage report[14]. 
8 Transmission 
Congestion Relief  
31  141  Based on CAISO congestion prices in 2007. 
9.1 T&D Upgrade 
Deferral 50th percentile  
481  687  Low: upgrade factor = 0.25. High: upgrade factor = 0.33. 
9.2 T&D Upgrade 
Deferral 90th percentile  
759  1,079  Same as above. 
10 Substation On-site 
Power  
1,800  3,000  Based on cost for standard storage solution. 
11 Time-of-use Energy 
Cost Management 
1226 1226 Based on PG&E's A6 time-of-use tariff. Six hours of 
storage discharge duration. 
12 Demand Charge 
Management  
582 582 Based on PG&E's A6 time-of-use tariff. Six hours of 
storage discharge duration. 
13 Electric Service 
Reliability  
359  978  Low: $20/kWh * 2.5 hours/year of avoided outages for 10 
years. High: 10 Years of UPS Cost-of-ownership (present 
value). 
14 Electric Service Power 
Quality  
359  978  Low: avoided power quality related cost, 10 years. High: 
UPS cost-of-ownership, 10 years (present value). 
15 Renewables Energy 
Time-shift  
233  389  Low: bulk wind generation. High: baseload RE generation. 
16 Renewables Capacity 
Firming  
709  915  Low: fixed orientation distributed PV. High: bulk wind 
generation. 
17.1 Wind Generation 
Grid Integration, Short 
Duration  
500  1,000 Though the estimated benefit is relatively high, a modest 
amount of storage (<0.1 kW) is needed per kW of wind 
generation.  
17.2 Wind Generation 
Grid Integration, Long 
Duration  
100  782 Low: avoid 1 outage in 10 years from wind generation 
shortfall. High: high estimate of benefit for reduced 
transmisison congestion. 
 
Reproduced with data from Eyer and Corey, 2010. 
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Appendix 2: Overview of Extant MW Scale Storage Systems and Basic Metrics 
  
Technology 
Option  
Maturity  Capacity 
(MWh)  
Power 
(MW)  
Duration(
hrs)  
% 
Efficiency 
(total 
cycles)  
Total 
Cost 
($/kW)  
Cost ($/kW-
h)  
Application: Bulk Energy Storage to Support System and Renewables Integration  
Pumped 
Hydro  
Mature  1680-
5300  
280-530 6-10  80-82 
(>13,000)  
2500-
4300  
420-430  
Pumped 
Hydro  
Mature  5400-
14,000  
900-1400  6-10  80-82 
(>13,000)  
1500-
2700  
250-270  
CT-CAES 
(underground)  
Demo  1440-
3600  
180  8  See note 1 
(>13,000)  
960  120  
CT-CAES 
(underground)  
Demo  1440-
3600  
180 20  See note 1 
(>13,000)  
1150  60  
CAES 
(underground)  
Commercial  1080  135 8  See note 1 
(>13000)  
1000  125  
CAES 
(underground)  
Commercial  2700  135  20  See note 1 
(>13000)  
1250  60  
Sodium-
Sulfur  
Commercial  300  50  6  75 (4500)  3100-
3300  
520-550  
Advanced 
Lead-Acid 
Commercial  200  50  4  85-90 
(2200)  
1700-
1900  
425-475  
Advanced 
Lead-Acid 
Commercial  250  20-50  5  85-90 
(4500)  
4600-
4900  
920-980  
Advanced 
Lead-Acid  
Demo  400  100  4  85-90 
(4500)  
2700  675  
Vanadium 
Redox  
Demo  250  50  5  65-75 
(>10000)  
3100-
3700  
620-740  
Zn/Br Redox  Demo  250  50  5  60 
(>10000)  
1450-
1750  
290-350  
Fe/Cr Redox  R&D  250  50  5  75 
(>10000)  
1800-
1900  
360-380  
Zn/air Redox  R&D  250  50  5  75 
(>10000)  
1440-
1700  
290-340  
Application: Energy Storage for ISO Fast Frequency Regulation and Renewables Integration  
Flywheel  Demo  5  20  0.25  85-87 
(>100,000)  
1950-2200 7800-8800  
Li-ion  Demo  0.25-25  1-100  0.25-1  87-92 
(>100,000)  
1085-1550  4340-6200  
Advanced 
Lead-Acid  
Demo  0.25-50  1-100  0.25-1  75-90 
(>100,000)  
950-1590  2770 
Application: Energy Storage for Utility Transmission &Distribution Grid Support Applications  
AES 
(abovegrou
nd)  
Demo  250  50  5  See note 1 
(>10,000)  
1950-2150  390-430  
Advanced 
Lead-Acid  
Demo  3.2-48  1-12  3.2-4  75-90 
(4500)  
2000-4600  625-1150 
Sodium-
Sulfur  
Commercia
l  
7.2  1  7.2  75 (4500)  3200-4000  445-555  
Zn/Br Flow  Demo  5-50  1-10  5  60-65 
(>10,000)  
1670-2015  340-1350  
Vanadium Demo  4-40  1-10  4  65-70 3000-3310  750-830  
  X 
Redox (>10,000)  
Fe/Cr Flow  R&D  4  1 4  75 
(>10000)  
1200-1600  300-400  
Zn/air  R&D  5.4  1  5.4  75 (4500)  1750-1900  325-350  
Li-ion Demo  4-24  1-10  2-4  90-94 
(4500)  
1800-4100  900-1700  
 
Recreated with data from Rastler, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: California Solar Initiative Metrics 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total CA Electricity Consumption 
(MWh) * 268,155,000 259,584,000 258,525,414 272645317.1 
Total Electricity Production under CSI 
(MWh) 46560 203352 306228 506127 
CSI Proportion of Total  0.000173631 0.000783376 0.001184518 0.001856357 
 
Data gathered from Energy Information Administration website at: 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/california/pdf/california.pdf 
 
Regression analysis of CSI program, starting in 2008, yields that CSI production’s proportion of 
total CA electricity consumption can be predicted by 
 
y = 0.0001e0.7522x 
  XI 
 
In 2016, with x = 8, y = 0.04099355695, or 4.1% of total consumption.  
 
Appendix 4: Energy Storage Valuation Technology Run Reference and Results 
Summary. 
 
Run # Detail B/C 
Ratio 
Breakeven 
Capital Cost 
($/kWh)(201
3$) 
Breakeven 
Capital 
Cost($/kW)(20
13$) 
run1 Use Case 1 (Bulk Energy Storage): 
Base Case 
1.17 842 1684 
run1 2010 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2010 Ref Year 1.05 565 1130 
run1 2010P4P Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2010 Ref Year 
with P4P regulation prices 
1.23 1079 2159 
run1 LMS100 Use Case 1:CONE derived with 
LMS100 
1.17 824 1649 
run1 lowCONE Use Case 1 Sensitivity: low CONE 1.08 632 1264 
run1a Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2 
Replacements 
1.07 619 1238 
run1b Use Case 1 Sensitivity: No regulation 
services 
0.98 433 865 
run1c Use Case 1: higher CapEX assumption 0.91 842 1684 
run1d Use Case 1: higher variable O&M 
assumption 
1.14 740 1480 
run1e Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 3 
Replacements 
0.97 377 754 
run2 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 2X Regulation 
Price 
1.38 1593 3186 
run3 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 3 Hour 
Duration 
1.10 594 1781 
run4 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: 4 Hour 
Duration 
1.05 465 1860 
run10 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market 
Scenario 1 
1.24 1010 2020 
run11 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market 
Scenario 2 
1.18 851 1701 
run12 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market 
Scenario 3 
1.47 1941 3883 
run13 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Market 
Scenario 4 
1.40 1619 3238 
run16 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Flow Battery 1.23 675 2699 
run16a Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Flow Battery 
(high variable O&M) 
1.20 628 2511 
run17 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Pumped Hydro 1.32 223 1783 
run18 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: CAES 1.27 232 1853 
run19 Use Case 2 (Ancillary Service Only): 
Base Case 
1.40 6712 1678 
run20 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Project Start 
Year 2015 
1.08 755 1509 
run21 Use Case 1 Sensitivity: Project Start 
Year 2015 with P4P regulation prices 
1.30 1471 2941 
run22 Use Case 3 (Distributed Storage): Base 
Case 
1.19 866 3464 
run22no reg Use Case 3 Sensitivity: No regulation 1.12 686 2745 
run22b Use Case 3 Sensitivity: 2 Hour 1.35 1509 3018 
  XII 
Duration 
run23 Use Case 3 Sensitivity: 2X P4P 
regulation prices 
1.35 1326 5306 
run24 Use Case 3 Sensitivity: High Load 
Growth Rate 
1.09 634 2537 
run26 Use Case 3 Sensitivity: Flow Battery 1.32 1009 4037 
run35 Use Case 3 Sensitivity: Project Start 
Year 2020 
1.30 940 3761 
 
Recreated with data from EPRI, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Levelised Costs of Electricity From Various Technologies.  
 
     2011     2030       2050 
Technology Life 
(year) 
TypicalP
lant Size 
(MW) 
Operationho
urs 
(h)1)(baselo
ad) 
CAPEX 
(EUR/k
W) 
Efficie
ncy 
(%) 
CAPEX 
(EUR/k
W) 
Efficie
ncy 
(%) 
CAPEX 
(EUR/k
W) 
Efficie
ncy 
(%) 
OPEX per 
year % of 
invest 
Gas open 
cycle 
25   250  6000  650  45 650  45  650  45 3.0% 
Gas CCGT 25   400  6000  800  60 800  62  800  62 2.5% 
Hard coal 
600 
35  800  7500  1300  45 1300  47  1300  49 2.0% 
Lignite 600 35  800  7500 1400  43 1400  47  1400  49 2.0% 
Hard coal / 
Lignite 700 
35   800  7500   2100  50  1800  52 2.0% 
Hard coal 
700 + CCS 
35  800  7500   3000  40  2700  41 2.0% 
HC 600 + 
Biomass-co-
firing 
30  800  7500  1390  45 1300  47  1300  49 2.0% 
Nuclear 
(EPR1600) 
40 1600  7900 3000 36 2600  37  2600  37 2.0% 
Pumped 
storage 
50-60  250 2500 1100-
2400 
80 1100-
2400 
80 1100-
2400 
80 1.0% 
Run-of-river 50-60  20-250  6000 1800-
2200 
90 800-
2200 
90 800-
2200 
90 1.0% 
Wind 
onshore 
25  2-3  1800  1100-
1300 
N/A 1100  N/A 1100 N/A 3.3% 
Wind off-
shore (near)  
25  5  3200  2000-
2200 
N/A 1800  N/A 1800 N/A 4.3% 
Wind off-
shore far  
25  5  3800  2600-
3000 
N/A 2200  N/A 2200 N/A 5.0% 
Solar PV 25  0.005-
0.5  
2000  1800-
2800 
N/A 1700 N/A 1700 N/A 1.0% 
Solar 
thermal CSP 
30  2-50  2800  3000-
3500 
N/A 2000  N/A 2000 N/A 2.0% 
Biomass 30  25  7500  2500  ~ 40 2500  ~ 40 2500  ~ 40 2.5% 
 
Recreated with data from VGB, 2012. 
 
 
